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1
INTRODUCTION
Business cycles and demand volatility prevent demand and supply from
being perfectly matched, and the existence of output gaps implies the
partial dissatisfaction of either consumers or producers. More worry-
ingly, persistent negative output gaps reveal a systematic excess of
physical capacity. After the 2009 financial and economic turmoil, the
issue of overcapacity turned out to be a priority in the policy agenda,
especially in those countries where demand and consumptions failed to
recover.
The first contributions to the comprehension of excess capacity date
back to the late 1970s, when available techniques and models failed
to explain the counter-cyclical behavior of capacity utilization, CU, fol-
lowing the rise in energy prices. At the same time, the Industrial Or-
ganization literature suggested two main explanations for the rise of
excess capacity. Overcapacity can arise as a result of strategic interac-
tion (as an excessive output commitment results of Spence (1977) and
Dixit (1979)) or as a reaction to demand uncertainty, as in Spencer
and Brander (1992) and Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997). Also, models
of international competition, such as Fagerberg (1988), explain that
countries may choose to hold excess capacity to foster their interna-
tional competitiveness and to match increases in demand.
Although excess capacity emerges in different imperfectly competi-
tive frameworks, the existing explanations fail to consider country or
sector specific factors that firms take into account when making their
capacity decisions. Throughout this thesis, we try to extend the anal-
ysis of excess capacity by looking at the impact of labour institutions.
The initial hint for this analysis was provided by the dramatic excess
capacity experienced by the automotive industry after the financial
crises. In Detroit, the plants of the Big-3 were lining unsold vehicles,
and huge parking lots, previously empty, were soon filled with cars. On
the other side of the ocean, Italian, and other European, car assembly
plants dramatically reduced their CU rate well below break-even. One
may argue that the United States benefit from a flexible labour mar-
ket, and our research question would find no fertile ground. Nonetheless,
the Big-3, at that time, were forced to deal with a giant trade union,
the United Auto Workers, which was able to negotiate not only unsus-
tainable hourly wages, but also extremely costly regulations in case of
lay-offs and dismissal. On the other side, Italy has always been char-
acterized by a relatively rigid labour market, with fragmented unions
and troublesome collective negotiations.
Although these examples refer to a very specific sector, during a
particular economic cycle, they made us wonder if and how the ex-
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ogenous institutional background in which firms are to operate favors
the rise of excess capacity. This thesis is thus an attempt to fill this
gap in the literature. To this purpose, we initially review the existing
contributions on physical capacity, and then we investigate the rela-
tion between overcapacity and labour market rigidity implementing a
twofold approach. On the theoretical side, we adopt an ex-ante point of
view and look at how labour institutions impact firms’ capacity invest-
ment decisions, and observe that capacity is increasing in the rigidity
of the labour market. Then, we evaluate the effect of labour protection
on firms’ short-tun output adjustments to assess the impact with an
ex-post perspective. We observe that the protection of skilled workers
tend to increase excess capacity, with the effect being more intense in
capital intensive industries.
1.1 the survey
In Chapter 2, we distinguish between aggregate indicators (potential
output, and output gaps) and micro-economic ones (physical capac-
ity and CU) and we investigate their role in business cycles. We re-
view the principal measurement techniques, and their main issues, that
have been developed overtime to estimate these trend and cycle compo-
nents. Then, we look at the Industrial Organization theory and review
the models of imperfect competition where excess capacity emerges.
As already mentioned, economic theory essentially suggests three main
drivers of over capacity: strategic interaction, demand uncertainty, and
increasing global competition.
In addition to the pure, and static, quantity competition games pro-
posed in the baseline contributions by Spence (1977), Dixit (1979),
Spencer and Brander (1992), Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997), we re-
view those different settings that still involve capacity decisions and
come up with excess capacity. First of all, excess capacity can also be
observed in mixed oligopolies, with quantity competition taking place
between a profit maximizing firm and a non-profit maximizing firm, for
instance, a labour managed firm or a public one.
In their contribution, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) embed capacity
decisions in a quantity and price game, and show that this game has a
unique equilibrium that corresponds exactly to the one-shot Cournot
game. Despite these results, this capacity and price setting has been em-
bedded in the analysis of collusive agreements, when firms can collude
either on capacities or on prices, as in Benoit and Krishna (1985), and
Davidson and Deneckere (1990). Another approach includes capacity
investment decisions, and capacity adjustments, in an infinite tempo-
ral horizon, as in Abel (1981) and Besanko et al. (2010).
We conclude this Chapter recalling the importance of finding alter-
native explanations for excess capacity, and stressing the need to look
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also at the consequences of overcapacity, not only in aggregate terms,
but fore and foremost also with a local perspective.
1.2 the theoretical paper
In chapter 3, we set up a two-stage quantity competition game between
two firms located in two different countries. Firms initially install phys-
ical capacity, according to their expectations over final demand. Once
uncertainty has resolved, firms employ labour to adjust their former
investment decisions so as to match final demand. Adjustments can
be thus either positive or negative, depending on the direction of the
shock.
We assume that second stage adjustment costs reflect the rigidity of
the labour market: in the good state, when firms must produce above
capacity, these costs reflect the different overtime wages firms must pay.
In the bad state instead, firms cannot destroy their capacity, so they
are forced to keep their plant partially idle: these adjustment costs thus
reflect the different temporary lay-off costs firms must sustain.
First of all, we observe that firms install capacity only if their ex-
pectations over final demand are positive. When, in fact, the expected
value of the demand additive shock is positive, firms invest in capacity
to get as close as possible to the level of expected demand. In this case,
we also observe that the firm incurring greater adjustment costs, and
thus a more rigid labour market, is also going to install a greater level
of physical capacity. This firm has in fact an additional incentive to
prefer output commitment, as this firm wants to minimize the impact
of future adjustment costs. If final demand is not too large, that is, if
the shock is relative small in magnitude, then this firm can also benefit
from a higher profitability.
If expectations over final demand are instead neutral or negative, firms
do not commit and rather wait for the realization of demand before
producing.
This framework thus shows that a more rigid labour market, as mod-
eled by greater labour costs during the adjustment process, determines
not only an initial greater output commitment, but also a greater ex-
cess capacity during economic downturns.
To extend our analysis, we consider two alternative cost specifications
that respectively introduce a certain degree of capacity-labour comple-
mentarity and assume that firing costs, and so negative adjustments,
are more costly.
1.3 the empirical paper
In Chapter 4, we estimate the impact of EPL on excess capacity. This
analysis is not a structural estimate of Chapter 3, as we look at the
effect of EPL on the short-run output adjustments rather than at the
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impact on firms’ initial investment.
We exploit a country-sector panel of European manufacturing indus-
tries and proxy excess capacity with the share of physical capacity that
is not used at the plant level, which is collected on a quarterly basis
from the Business and Consumer Survey. In addition to this exogenous,
country-specific constraint, we also include the capital intensity of the
corresponding US industry, a key information that measures the irre-
versibility of former investment decisions.
In light of the predictions of the theoretical Chapter, and consider-
ing that capital intensive industries cannot easily adjust to demand
fluctuations, we expect both the elements to contribute to the rise of
excess capacity. More particularly, we estimate that an increase in the
protection of regular, or skilled, workers is detrimental to the CU rate,
and ultimately contribute to the generation of excess capacity. We also
find a robust evidence that the effect of EPL is stronger, in terms of
excess capacity, in capital intensive industries.
As a robustness check, we perform a diff-in-diff analysis and observe
that countries experiencing an increase in EPL overtime also tend to
experience greater overcapacity.
2
A SURVEY ON PHYS ICAL CAPACITY
Abstract
Although the first contributions on overcapacity date back to the 1970s,
the recent economic and financial crises revealed how exposed industries
are, in terms of excess capacity, to demand volatility and uncertainty,
and persistent negative output gaps suggest that the comprehension of
excess capacity is far from being complete.
This work reviews the main definitions of potential output, output gaps,
and CU, and surveys the available measurement techniques, both empir-
ical and theoretical. This paper also surveys the existing explanations
for excess capacity suggested by the theoretical literature (strategic in-
teraction, demand uncertainty, and international competitiveness), and
stresses the importance of finding alternative explanations for overca-
pacity, accounting, for instance, for the institutional background in
which firms are to operate.
Keywords: Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and
Finance, Industrial organization.
JEL Classification: F4, L.
2.1 introduction
Physical capacity, or production capacity, indicates the maximum out-
put that can be attained by a single unit of analysis, from a single plant
up to an entire country, in a given time framework. Hence, the fate of
potential output, in terms of creation and destruction, of accumulation
and dismantling, reveals the long-run economic trend, and accounts
for firms’ investment decisions and for the soundness of the economic
system as a whole. Deviations of actual production from this measure
of potential output are instead business cycle adjustments, that link
the real and monetary sides. As such, output gaps are constantly and
carefully monitored by monetary and fiscal institutions.
These indicators gained considerable attention in the economic re-
search agenda at the end of the 1970s, when theoretical works suc-
cessfully modeled firms’ capacity investment decisions and when the
first measurement techniques were developed. Nonetheless, the 2009
financial global crises revealed, in a dramatically intensive way, how
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vulnerable the industrial sector is to financial volatility and to demand
shocks. The credit crunch that followed the mortgage crises soon spread
to the industrial side: before 2009, firms were, generally speaking, op-
erating at full capacity. After 2009, when the financial crises impacted
the real side of the economy, final consumption levels dropped and most
firms experienced excess capacity, with severe repercussions on employ-
ment levels, inflation, and social stability. All these elements suggest
that economic research on excess capacity is far from being over. New
theoretical models are needed to understand why firms still commit
to levels of output that are unsustainable during economic downturns,
and new, updated, policy guidelines are needed to stress and encourage
the adoption of a more forward thinking firm behavior. Overcapacity is
unquestionably a serious concern for industrialized countries, as it en-
tails resource waste, unemployment, land desolation, and so on. Figures
1 and 2 show how persistently negative output gaps lead to increases
in unemployment levels and threaded decreases in the inflation rate,
almost achieving deflation.1
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Figure 1: Negative output gaps, unemployment, and inflation
Lower CU also affects firms’ profitability, as lower production volumes
may impede firms to break-even. Persistently low production volumes
may trigger plant closures and massive lay-offs, with consequences not
only on aggregate fundamentals, but also on micro, and regional, indi-
cators. The fate of an industry, for instance, the automotive one, can be
detrimental to a whole country or even to a single city, as it happened
1 Aggregate data are collected from the OECD economic outlook. The countries in-
cluded are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Ko-
rea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, from 1990
to 2013.
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Figure 2: The Italian case
in Detroit. Figure 3 displays the House Price Index, the motor indus-
try employment level (in thousands), and the unemployment rate for
the Detroit Metropolitan area.2 Interestingly, the excess capacity ex-
perienced by the Detroit automotive industry triggered plant closures,
lay-offs, and eventually also affected housing prices:3 during the big
recession, Detroit property prices almost fell down to the 1990 levels.4
This work surveys the existing literature on physical and excess ca-
pacity adopting a twofold approach, to emphasize once more how theory
and applied economics should move together. On one side, this work
recalls the different definitions related to production capacity (poten-
tial output, output gap, index of industrial production and CU rate),
as reported in Section 2.2.1. Then, it reviews the main measurement
techniques, in Section 2.2.2, and it describes the role of production ca-
pacity and CU in Real Business Cycle models, Section 2.3.
The second approach focuses on the theoretical comprehension of
production capacity and excess capacity, and mainly relies on the con-
tributions to the Industrial Organization theory. Section 2.4.1 reviews
the main explanations for excess capacity in models of imperfect com-
petition, whereas Section 2.4.2 classifies the different frameworks that
have been set up in the analysis of excess capacity: pure oligopolies vs.
mixed duopolies, models of pure quantity competition vs. models of
quantity and price competition, and static games vs. dynamic games.
Last, Section 2.5 draws the main conclusion and provides some sugges-
tions for future research.
2 Data are taken from S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case-Shiller MI-Detroit
Home Price Index [DEXRSA], retrieved from FRED, FRB of St. Louis https://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DEXRSA/,November24,2014.
3 The baseline year for the House Price Index is January 2000.
4 Further information on the collection of housing prices are available at http://www.
spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller.
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2.2 production capacity
2.2.1 Definitions
From an aggregate point of view, the monitoring and correct estimation
of potential output and output gaps is necessary for the implementa-
tion of suitable monetary and fiscal policies. More specifically, potential
output, also known as production capacity, is the "maximum amount of
goods and services an economy can turn out when it is most efficient -
that is, at full capacity"5 when price pressures are absent. Hence, out-
put gaps, defined as the percentage deviation of actual output from
potential output, can explain inflationary trends: positive gaps reveal
an excess of demand that can be compensated only with an increase
in the price level. On the contrary, negative output gaps indicate an
excess of supply, and prices must fall. Empirically, these two measures
cannot be quantified: they can only be estimated. Measurement tech-
niques are more thoroughly described in Section 2.2.2. Here, for sake of
convenience, let’s just say that observed output is made of a trend and
of a cycle. Hence, filtering output from its cyclical component is the
first approach to estimate potential output.6 Alternatively, potential
output can be estimated by means of a production function: for given
inputs, the production function provides the maximum attainable level
of output.7
5 As described by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/09/basics.htm
6 Filtering techniques have extensively been described in Cotis et al. (2005).
7 As reported by Cotis et al. (2005), the OECD estimates potential output assuming
a Cobb-Douglas production function, with Hicks-neutral technology.
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The industrial production index allows for a better inspection of in-
dustrial dynamics. More specifically, this index is based on the output
volume generated by production units: data are collected at the sector
level by the OECD on a monthly basis, and are then aggregated at the
country level with specific industry weights. Also, this index is classified
with respect to 2010, the base year. Still, this index only provides an
aggregate measure for industrial sectors, and is available at the single-
digit level.8
CU rates are collected at a more disaggregated level, and refer to the
ratio between actual output and potential, or maximum, output that
could be produced by a single plant for given factor endowments and
technology. Despite the plant-specific level of analysis, this measure
is often aggregated at the industry level,9 as done by the OECD and
by the Federal Reserve. Surveys, though limited in nature,10 may be
a valid alternative, and are often used by economists to gain a closer
look at supply dynamics. The Business and Consumer Survey (BCS)
gathers production information of manufacturing firms in 27 European
countries, collected by National Statistical Offices,11 and provides a
country-sector measure for the CU rate.12
The FRB gathers the monthly CU rate13 of all the manufacturing, min-
ing, electric and gas utilities production facilities located in the United
States,14 and consequently aggregates them at the industry level.15
2.2.2 Measurement techniques
This Section considers the econometric tools used to estimate poten-
tial output, output gaps, and CU. The first contributions date back to
the 1980s, when the identification of proper techniques became a pri-
ority in the research agenda. Before, CU was considered as a mere pro-
cyclical variable, that moved along other business cycle measures, such
as labour productivity, investments, and Tobin’s q. In the mid 1970s,
at the onset of the energetic crises, fluctuations in CU turned out to be
counter cyclical. As a consequence, researchers started devoting their
8 That is, within the industrial sector, the Industrial Production Index is reported for
the Mining industry, the Manufacturing industry, and for the Electricity, gas and
water industry.
9 1-Digit only.
10 As reported by the IMF, survey recipients may answer in a non-homogenous way,
and the response rate may not always be satisfactory.
11 More information on the national criteria adopted are available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/metadata/
index_en.htm.
12 Information are aggregated at the 2-digit level.
13 This rate corresponds to a seasonally adjusted output index, which is divided by a
capacity index. This index quantifies the sustainability of maximum output.
14 Data are collected at the NAICS 3 or 4 -digit level.
15 Further information at available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/CapNotes.htm.
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attention to the measurement of all the above mentioned variables in
the attempt of finding an explanation for this atypical behavior.
2.2.2.1 Potential output and output gap
As already mentioned, potential output can be estimated by means of
either a production function or output filtering techniques. Among the
available filtering techniques, Cotis et al. (2005) recall:
1. Trend methods, including linear trend,16 and split trend;17
2. Univariate filter methods: Hodrick Prescott filter,18 Baxter-King
filter,19 Beveridge Nelson decomposition,20 and Kalman filter;21
3. Multivariate filters: Hodrick-Prescott Multivariate,22 Beveridge-
Nelson decomposition,23 and Kalman filter.24
The Production function approaches classified by Cotis et al. (2005)
are:
1. Full structural model, with inputs determined endogenously from
a macroeconomic model;
2. Production function with exogenous trends, with inputs deter-
mined exogenously using uni or multivariate filters;
3. Structural VAR, that estimates potential output and output gaps
according to structural assumptions on economic disturbances.
Cotis et al. (2005) also review the results of these estimation tech-
niques, and report an average 0.7/0.9 correlation index among them.
Although profile estimates may be similar, these alternative methods
may come up with asymmetric output gap characterizations.25 Still,
after all, these differences in the gaps amplitude are "low compared
to the uncertainties surrounding their estimation". The authors also
16 Where the trend component is linear in time.
17 Trend output is calculated during each cycle, that is, between economic peaks.
18 Which introduces a trade-off between a "good fit to the actual series and the degree
of smoothness of the trend series", and then filters the trend component.
19 This technique retrieves a linear trend preserving intermediate (business cycle) com-
ponents, and rules out slow moving and high frequency (respectively trend and
irregular) values.
20 This techniques retrieves the trend/cycle decomposition after the imposition of cer-
tain restrictions on both the elements.
21 In addition to trend cycle, this technique also includes erratic components.
22 This filter now also includes structural economic relations, such as the Phillips curve,
and the Okun Law.
23 The trend is a random walk, and the stochastic component is a linear combination
of innovations of GDP and other long-term GDP related variables.
24 Now taking into account also other information such as the Philips Curve.
25 For instance, in European countries HP output gaps are larger than Kalman filter
output gaps.
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report correlation statistics for output gap estimates and CU rates, re-
porting that "the HP measure of the gap is found to have a higher
correlation with CU than methods based on linear trend". As far as
production function techniques are concerned, Cotis et al. (2005) state
that "potential output estimates (. . . ) are somewhat more sensitive to
cyclical factors (as for instance they use series of actual capital stock),
but their volatility remains lower than for the majority of the statistical
methods".
Despite these estimates proved to be robust and correlated, Orphanides
and van Norden (2002) describe some different measurement issues that
may question the reliability of output gap estimates. First of all, real
time and ex-post estimates often do not coincide since output data are
often revised. Then, interpretations of the business cycle are also sub-
ject to the availability of data: as new quarterly information becomes
available, interpretations, or also the underlying model used to explain
business cycle, may change. Aware of these measurement concerns, the
authors review the estimates of the US output gap from 1960 using al-
ternative methods to distinguish between the trend and the cycle. For
each technique, they compare real-time estimates with the revisions
that followed, and show that "revisions are of the same order of magni-
tude as the estimated output gap itself for all the methods examined".
This finding confirms their initial concerns, as real time output gap es-
timates are not particularly reliable,26 because end-of-sample estimates
are not reliable themselves: in fact, real-time estimates would be unre-
liable also with the introduction of more reliable real-time data.
In a recent work, Borio et al. (2013) reject the definition of poten-
tial output as an inflation-free measure,27 and propose an alternative
estimate for potential output and output gaps that also includes the
financial cycle.28 They observe that financial cycles, as measured by
credit behavior and property prices, contribute to the explanation of
output cycles and can lead to a more accurate measurement of poten-
tial output. Figure 4 compares the IMF, OECD, HP ex-post and real
time estimates of the US potential output with the finance-neutral mea-
sure proposed by the authors. Before the onset of the financial crises,
the three real time standard measures reported a very small output
gap, with output "below, or at most close to, potential". Only with an
ex-post perspective did these measures reveal that actual output was
above its potential and sustainable level. Instead, the real-time and ex-
post estimates of the finance-neutral classification almost coincide, and
26 They distinguish between revisions on the data itself from revisions on the potential
output generation process.
27 For the authors, the omission of inflation is wrong from a conceptual point of view, as
financial imbalances may occur also when output increases along a non sustainable
path in the absence of inflationary pressures, and also from a measurement perspec-
tive, as the financial cycle does take into account output cyclical components.
28 The authors include financial information in the measure of potential output derived
from the HP filter.
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predict more properly the true output cycle. Hence, this finance-neutral
measure proves to be more accurate than the other available measures,
robust in real time, and may provide reliable policy guidelines.
Figure 4: Different measures of output gaps,
from Borio et al. (2013)
2.2.2.2 Capacity utilization
Berndt and Morrison (1981) and Nelson (1989) provide a theoretical
background for the measurement of capacity and CU. Formally, physical
capacity, meant as potential output, can be identified either as the min-
imum point of the Short-Run Average Total Cost Curve (SRATC) or as
the point corresponding to the tangency between the Long-Run Aver-
age Total Cost (LRATC) Curve and SRATC. CU is usually referred to
as the ratio between actual output and capacity, as defined above, and
can be measured in three different ways, depending on the definition
of capacity adopted:
1. An engineering definition:29
CUo =
Q
Qo
(1)
where Qo is the maximum attainable output for a given short-run
stock of capital;
2. An economic definition:
CU t =
Q
Qt
(2)
where Qt is the output level corresponding to the tangency be-
tween LRATC and SRATC;
29 Berndt and Morrison (1981) state that this is a measure of "capital utilization rather
than an economic measure of CU".
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3. Another economic definition:
CUm =
Q
Qm
(3)
where Qm is the output level that minimizes SRATC.
As far as the measurement of CU is concerned, Nelson (1989) introduces
a variable translog cost function to estimate Qt and Qm, in equations
(2) and (3) respectively. The different estimations for CU are compared,
and the author observes that both the economic definitions, CU t and
CUm, are significantly greater than the engineering definition, CUo,30
suggesting that the Qo measure may underestimate potential output.
Also, CUo may not be a good proxy for the real CU since its correlation
with the two other classifications is relatively low. Such an evidence re-
veals that the engineering definition, often introduced in the literature,
may not be a sound indicator for CU, and the author stresses, once
more, the importance of identifying a good measurement for CU.
Berndt and Morrison (1981) observe that these theoretical defini-
tions31 fail to take into account the effect of energy price changes and
state that existing measures of CU lost much of their explanatory power,
mainly because of the weak link between them and the underlying eco-
nomic theory. More specifically, they report that the increase in CU
during the 1970s stemmed from the increase in energy prices, and not
from an increase in investments and in average labour productivity. To
fill this gap, they review the existing theoretical definitions of CU to pre-
dict the impact of changes in energy prices on CU, with capacity being
the outcome of either profit-maximization (Y ∗∗) or cost-minimization
(Y ∗), with Y ∗∗ > Y ∗ if the exogenous output price is greater than the
minimum of SRATC. Then, they define CU as u = Y /Y ∗ and assess
how input prices affect both Y ∗ and u, assuming that there are two
factors of production: capital K, which is quasi-fixed, and energy E,
which is instead variable. If the two inputs are Hicks-Allen substitutes,
then, an increase in the price of E reduces Y ∗;32 if the two inputs are
instead complements, pE and Y ∗ move in the same direction. From an
empirical point of view, the authors report two different approaches
for the measurement of CU: the first is a dynamic cost function with
one quasi-fixed input (capital), and the second is a model with two
quasi-fixed factors (capital and skilled labour). As a last step, they em-
pirically assess the impact of energy price changes of capacity output
but observe only a small, though positive, relation between the two.
The authors conclude that "applied researchers in the future will de-
vote greater attention and care to the economic theory underlying the
concept of capacity output". In another work, Berndt and Hesse (1986)
estimate the capacity output of nine OECD countries by means of a
30 Respectively by an average of 16.4% and 25.4%.
31 Equations (1), (2), and (3).
32 The long-run level of capital and the long-run capital-output ratio must increase.
Still, in the short-run, capital is fixed. Hence, capacity output must go down.
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translog variable cost function. They find evidence of a pervasive excess
capacity in the early 1980s and they trace it back to the rise in energy
prices, whose impact on capacity output has considerably increased
overtime. Once more, they find that this effect on capacity is small if
compared to that of capital and labour.
Morrison (1985), despite the observed counter-cyclical behavior of
CU, explains that "movements in certain cyclical measure are not ran-
dom but can be viewed as systematic results of a rational economic
optimization process undertaken by the firm" in a context of dynamic
optimization. This dynamic model takes into account adjustments to
optimal and desired level of capital, and CU33 ultimately measures the
shadow value of the quasi-fixed inputs.
Fare et al. (1989) consider the definition of capacity proposed by Jo-
hansen (1968), according to whom capacity is "the maximum amount
that can be produced per unit of time with existing plant and equip-
ment, provided that the availability of variable factors of production is
not restricted", and extend the measurement of capacity to the plant-
level. In this way, they obtain a definition of plant CU without speci-
fying any particular functional forms. The mere observation of inputs
and output generates in fact a maximum frontier output defined by
Φ(x, k) = max z
K∑
k=1
zkuk (4)
where z is a vector of intensity variables that relates inputs and out-
puts (xk,uk). The authors apply this result to a sample of coal-fired
steam-electric plants in Illinois in 1968 and evaluate the corresponding
CU with either constant or variable returns to scale34
The reliability of CU data has been questioned also by Kennedy
(1998), who compares the CU rates provided by the FRB with alterna-
tive time-series, obtained from HP-filtered industrial production data,35
to come up with a measurement of CU that may explain inflationary
pressures. This time-series performs equally well than the FRB mea-
sure, and the Granger causality test from CU to prices reveals the higher
predictive power for inflation of industrial production time-series.
33 Defined as output over optimal output, given by the minimum of SRATC.
34 CU is defined as the ratio between either observed and capacity output, or observed
output over installed generating capacity.
35 The author questions the consistency of the FRB measurement techniques, as some
data have been excluded from the analysis and estimates have changed over time.
Also, the definition of capacity adopted by FRB strongly relies on the underlying
assumptions, and estimates may then be biased. The detrended time-series suggested
by the author, that defines capacity as the stochastic trend in output, overcome these
two issues as it is obtained from industrial production data (and is thus unaffected
by the omission of relevant data).
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2.3 output, capacity and the business cycle
In this section, we review works that embed CU rates within Real Busi-
ness Cycles, RBC. Usually, RBC models assume that, at each stage, the
whole stock of capital is used, that the resulting equilibrium stochas-
tic process is linear and that factor shares are constant.36 Greenwood
et al. (1988) consider a neoclassical framework with endogenous CU to
explain how investment shocks are transmitted to the labour market.
Positive shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment foster capi-
tal accumulation, and indirectly impact the rate of CU: future capital
is more productive,37 and changes in CU increase labour productivity,
which in turn boosts consumption levels, increases the real wage rate
and equilibrium employment.
The framework developed by Cooley et al. (1995) tries to add some
realism to the RBC analysis and assumes that, at each stage, some cap-
ital is idle, with only the remaining part of the capital stock being
subject to technological change. Without assuming a specific aggregate
production function, the authors concentrate on the production deci-
sions at the individual plant level38 to assess the impact of technological
change on aggregate fluctuations. The authors conclude that the cycli-
cal properties of RBC are robust to the introduction of idle resources.
Hansen and Prescott (2005) consider a plant-level production deci-
sion similar to Cooley et al. (1995) to evaluate how capacity constraints,
that are binding only when all plants are operative, affect the business
cycle. They retrieve the individual production function with variable
factor shares, since CU can vary, and show, once more, that the cyclical
properties of business cycles are unaffected, although cycles are more
asymmetric and the share of labour income is counter-cyclical.
Recent works also embed capacity-related issues in a context of mon-
etary and financial cycles. For instance, Alvarez-Lois (2006) considers
a model for monetary transmissions with macroeconomic propagation.
Firms install capacity under demand uncertainty, and firms are con-
strained in the short-run with respect to factor substitution. These
elements together may explain the rise of underutilized capacity. The
author also assumes that uncertainty is idiosyncratic, which results in
heterogeneous CU rates.39 The author investigates firms’ reaction, both
in terms of production values and marginal costs, or wages, to mone-
36 As long as the aggregate production function is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas.
37 As stated by the authors, this approach is more realistic than assuming direct shocks
to the production function.
38 At each stage, the plant manager must in fact choose between operating the plant
or letting the plant idle. The plant is operative if and only if it can generate enough
output to cover labour costs. Each plant is subject to idiosyncratic shocks to tech-
nology.
39 In equilibrium, some firms may thus experience idle capacity and other firms may
be producing at full capacity.
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tary shocks:40 firms that were previously experiencing excess capacity
can expand their production facilities without incurring a significant
increase in marginal costs, while other firms cannot match this extra-
demand. Firms holding idle resources at equilibrium can now vary their
CU rate, and the marginal cost of increasing production is lower than
the marginal increase in production. Hence, this framework stresses the
role of idle factors, such as capacity, in the transmission of the real ef-
fects of monetary policies.
Furceri and Mourougane (2012) investigate the effect of financial
crises on potential output. The authors identify several direct transmis-
sion channels: first of all, demand is lower during financial crises, and
inevitably reduces firms’ incentives to invest in capital. Financial crises
can also increase the structural unemployment rate, although their ef-
fect on labour participation rates is not well defined.41 Also the effect
of Total Factor Productivity, TFP, is to some extent ambiguous.42 The
authors also stress that policymakers’ response to economic downturns
may indirectly impact potential output and the long-term growth rate.
They calculate potential output as the combination of TFP, tfp∗t , cap-
ital stock, k∗t , and employment, etp∗t ,43
y∗t = tfp
∗
t + (1− α)k∗t + αetp∗t (5)
and estimate the following univariate autoregressive growth equation
on 30 OECD countries from 1960 to 2008 to derive the impulse response
function:
git = ai +
4∑
j=1
βjgi,t−j +
4∑
j=0
δjDi,t−j + εit (6)
where g is the annual growth rate of potential output, D is a dummy
equal to 1 at the onset of a financial crises, and ai are the country fixed
40 In this setting, final goods are sold in a perfectly competitive market, and
the representative firm has a constant return to scale, CES function, Yt =∫ 1
0 [(Y
(ε−1)/ε
j,t )(υ
1/ε
j,t )dj]
ε/(ε−1), with the input elasticity of substitution equal to
ε > 1, and where Yj,t is the quantity of intermediate input j used for the produc-
tion of the final good j at time t. The supply of input j if fixed at Y¯j,t. The term υj,t
in the production function reflects the realization of the idiosyncratic, productivity
shock to input j, and can be rewritten as υj,t =
Y¯j,t
(Pj,t/Pt)−εYt
, where (Pj,t/Pt) is
the market-power of the intermediate firm and Yt is a spillover effect.
41 There is a positive effect (additional worker effect) from second-earners searching
for a job to compensate for their income losses, but there is also a negative effect
(discouraged worker effect) related to discouraged workers who give up looking for
a job given the high unemployment rate.
42 R&D is in fact a pro-cyclical expenditure, and during economic downturns TFP
goes down. Still, firms may have greater incentive to restructure and improve their
productivity during downturns to reduce their losses.
43 Employment is defined as etp∗t = (1− u∗t )h∗t prlf∗t pop∗t , where u∗t is the structural
unemployment rate, h∗t is the the number of hours worked, prlf∗t is the participation
rate, and pop∗t is the working age population.
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effects. This empirical strategy allows the authors to find the over-
all44 impact of financial crises on potential output, and they observe
that financial crises tend to reduce potential output by an average
1.5%− 2.4%.45
The erosion of potential output during financial crises emerges also
in Bijapur (2012), that looks at the effect of financial crises in 9 OECD
countries after 1990. The author estimates the Phillips curve to pre-
dict the growth inflationary component following financial crises, and
observes that recovery from financial crises needs higher inflationary
pressure relative to other economic downturns. This increase in infla-
tion is detrimental to potential output.
Also Benati (2012) focuses on the consequences of financial turmoils
on the potential output of few selected countries.46 By means of a
Blanchard-Quah decomposition,47 the author exploits the following
VAR model to estimate the log natural real GDP:
Yt = B0 +B1Yt−1 + · · ·+BpYt−p + t (7)
where Yt ≡ [δyt,Xt]′ and where yt,Xt respectively are the log-difference
of real GDP and a vector of covariance-stationary covariates. The au-
thor finds that, with a probability equal to 88.8% and 79.9% respec-
tively, the growth rate of potential output in the Euro area and in the
USA respectively fall by −0.9% and −1.3% between the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and 2011Q1. The UK faced a more severe decline, as
the growth rate slowed down by −4.4%.
Another branch of economic theory looks at the sustainability of
collusive agreements when demand is volatile and firms are capacity
constrained. Fabra (2006) investigates how capacity constraints affect
the sustainability of collusive agreements under business cycles fluctu-
ations,48 and shows that "that the issue of whether firms find it more
difficult to collude during booms or recessions is linked to the value
of firms’ capacities". In this setting, homogeneous firms initially make
44 Hence not country-specific.
45 Most of the effect is related to capital.
46 The Euro Area as a whole, the United States, Japan and the UK.
47 The author hence introduces the original level variables of Blanchard and Quah
(1989) to overcome the stationarity and correlation with the business cycle of the
unemployment rate.
48 This work is an extension to Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), that study the
sustainability of collusive agreements under demand uncertainty without capacity
constraints. In a nutshell, the authors show that agreements are less sustainable
during downturns. Also Green and Porter (1984) look at the stability of collusive
behavior with uncertain demands. In their specification, demand fluctuations are
not observed by firms, but cycles can still affect the performance of the industry,
and may lead to unstable productions. Firms may act either as monopolists or
as Cournot players, depending on the price realization. Firms agree on a "trigger
price", according to which they decide their behavior: if the market price falls below
this trigger price, then the two firms acts as monopolists; if instead the market
price is greater than the trigger price, than two two firms temporarily play Cournot
competition before going back to their monopolist behavior.
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their simultaneous pricing decisions,49 and an efficient rationing rule al-
locates sales.50 When capacity constraints are sufficiently binding, and
installed capacities are relatively small, collusion is less sustainable dur-
ing economic expansions, since firms cannot satisfy excess of demand
and punishment from deviations are low. For sufficiently large capac-
ities, agreements can instead be more easily sustained. On the other
side, economic downturns may lead to the rise of excess capacity and
the economic consequences of deviation would be more intense.
2.4 a theoretical explanation for physical and ex-
cess capacity
The industrial organization literature on physical capacity owes a sig-
nificant research effort to the seminal contribution of Cournot and to
his quantity competition setting. In the last century, researchers have
extended the implications of strategic interaction by considering also
investment decisions. It is in this precise framework that the concept
of physical capacity emerges. Overtime, authors have set up different
models and different games to understand the determinants of firms’
capacity investment decisions.
2.4.1 Why?
Why do firms invest in physical capacity? The answers provided so
far by the industrial organization literature have identified three ma-
jor explanations: investments in physical capacity can be the result of
strategic interaction, of demand uncertainty, and of rising international
competition.
As far as strategic interaction is concerned, the seminal contributions
by Spence (1977) and Dixit (1979) identify initial output commitment
as the best entry deterrence response. More specifically, Spence (1977)
considers a two-stage game between an incumbent and a potential en-
trant, with both firms producing the same homogeneous good. The
author develops two different models: in the first one, capacity does
not affect marginal costs, whereas in the second specification, marginal
costs are decreasing in capacity. The two cost structures are
C(x, k) = c(x) + rk C(x, k) = c(x, k) + rk (8)
where x is output and k is capacity, and where cxk < 0 in the sec-
ond specification. When there is an entry threat, the established firm
49 Production above capacity implies an infinite cost and hence is ruled out.
50 Consumers initially buy from the low-cost firm; once its capacity has been exhausted,
consumer start buying from the second low-cost firm, and so on, until the capacity
of the high-priced firm is exhausted, too.
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Figure 5: Reaction functions with fixed costs,
in Dixit (1979)
chooses a level of capacity k to reduce the post-entry price and the
entrant’s profits. In either model, entry is deterred if
P (k+ y) ≤ a(y, y) = C(y)
y
+ r P¯ (k, kˆ) ≤ C(y¯(k, k¯), kˆ)
y¯(k, kˆ)
+ rkˆ
(9)
Under the first cost specification, entry is deterred if the post-entry
price P (k+ y), where k is the incumbent’s output and y is the entrant’s
supply, falls below the entrant’s average costs. Then, the incumbent
maximizes its profits with respect to k and x under two constraints:
x ≤ k, to ensure profit maximization, and k ≤ k¯, to ensure entry deter-
rence, as k¯ is the minimum level of capacity needed to block entry.
The second equation of (9) refers to the second model specification. In
this case, entry is blocked once again if the post entry price is lower
than the entrant’s average costs when it produces kˆ. The minimum
level to deter entry is k¯, so the established firm must maximize profits
subject to the constraint k ≥ k¯. In this setting, the incumbent chooses
to hold excess capacity in order to deter entry in the next stage of the
game. If, on one side, this irreversible investment decision successfully
deters entry, on the other side it makes production inefficient, as the
corresponding price will excess the limit price. Still, this model offers
an innovative approach for interpreting investment decisions, as the au-
thor clearly states that "existing firms choose capacity in a strategic
way designed to discourage entry".
Dixit (1979) considers a quantity competition game between one in-
cumbent and one large entrant and investigates how the incumbent
deals with entry threats. The author introduces fixed costs, thus affect-
ing reaction functions, which are now discontinuous, as displayed in
Figure 5.51
Depending on the magnitude of fixed costs, there are multiple equilib-
ria: both firms are active, or there is only one firm, acting as a monopo-
51 With the point of discontinuity depending on the level of fixed costs.
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list.52 The author considers two different cases: in the first one, known
as the Sylos postulate, the level of output chosen by the incumbent is
constant, also after entry. In the second specification, he assumes that
the incumbent threatens entry by choosing a sufficiently large value of
output: to make this strategy credible, the incumbent must hold enough
capacity already before entry. The introduction of capacity affects the
entry-deterrence and the entry-accommodation zones. Figure 6 displays
the different acceptance/deterrence regions of each specification.
In the first case,53 if fixed costs are small, entry cannot be impeded, and
the two firms play Stackelberg competition, which occurs for B1 > Z1.
If fixed costs are large, the firm chooses not to enter (hence entry is
blocked) and the incumbent acts as an unrestrained monopolist, which
occurs for B1 < M1. For intermediate fixed costs, the incumbent ap-
plies the limit price strategy to block entry, but in this way it cannot
act as an unrestrained monopolist. This occurs for M1 < B1 < Z1.
In the second specification instead, for B1 < M1 entry is blockaded;
for M1 < B1 < Z1 entry is deterred by the limit price strategy;54 for
M1 < B1 < Z1 entry is deterred by the excess capacity strategy, and for
Z1 < B1 entry is accommodated. Thus, the existence of a sufficiently
high level of capacity helps the incumbent to successfully deter entry,
and eventually increases the area in which entry is effectively impeded.
(a) Sylos Postulate (b) Excess capacity
Figure 6: Entry deterrence and entry accommodation,
from Dixit (1979)
Dixit (1980) considers a framework similar to Dixit (1979) to intro-
duce irreversible investment decisions. The initial level of capacity cho-
sen by the incumbent affects in fact the post-entry marginal cost curve,
its reaction curve and the post-entry game conditions. In this frame-
work, the outcome of the entry decision can lead to either Cournot
competition, in case of entry, or to a monopolist scenario, in case of
52 If fixed costs are small, the discontinuity point lies in an irrelevant region and the
Cournot Nash equilibrium is unaffected. If instead fixed costs are large for the en-
trant, there can be two equilibria.
53 As displayed in the left-hand side picture.
54 With output x1 = µ1 and capacity k1 = B1.
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no entry. According to the choice of capacity k¯1, the incumbent’s cost
specification is
C1 =
 f1 + r1k¯1 +w1x1 if x1 ≤ k1f1 + (r1 +w1)x1 if x1 ≥ k1 (10)
Equilibrium thus depends on the choice of output x2 of the entrant, as
this choice affects the marginal revenues of firm 1; to act as a leader, the
"established firm can exercise leadership over a limited range by using
its capacity choice to manipulate the initial conditions of that game".
So the incumbent can effectively implement the leadership strategy,
thanks to the capacity choice, only over a limited range: as long as the
two firms play according to Nash equilibrium rules, there is no over
investment in capacity by the incumbent, thus in contrast with the
over-capacity prediction of Spence (1977).
The second rational for over-capacity has to be found in the contri-
butions that include demand uncertainty. The work by Spencer and
Brander (1992) considers alternative quantity duopolies, and look at
how the introduction of demand uncertainty affects the trade-off be-
tween commitment and flexibility, as the option-value of flexibility55
may be offset by strategic interaction. The authors consider three differ-
ent settings. The first model is a Stackelberg output leadership model,
with the incumbent choosing between making an initial commitment or
waiting for demand realization. Still, if demand is sufficiently uncertain,
the incumbent prefers to wait for demand realization. In the second sce-
nario, both firms can decide whether to invest before or after demand
resolution: they introduce firm-specific uncertainty and observe the rise
of a natural leader. As a last step, they look at how uncertainty over
the rival’s cost affects the incumbent’s trade-off.
Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) investigate "the impact of uncertain
demand on firms’ capacity decision when they operate in an oligopolis-
tic environment". In their model, two identical firms face a linear de-
mand with a random intercept. Firms install capacity unaware of which
state of nature will realize in the second stage. Only after the resolution
of uncertainty, firms produce. The authors find a symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium in which both firms hold excess capacity, with re-
spect to the capacity they would have chosen in the Cournot certainty
equivalent scenario. In the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium char-
acterization, both firms choose
k∗1 = k
∗
2 = k
∗ =
1
3

n∑
i∗+1
ρsAs − β
n∑
i∗+1
ρs
− γ
 (11)
where A and ρ are respectively the demand intercept and the objective
probability of the state of nature s, β is the marginal cost of capacity,
55 Flexibility has an option value as firms delay their investment decisions and wait for
the realization of demand.
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γ is the marginal cost of production, and i∗ denotes the threshold state
in which firms choose to be capacity constrained. The authors thus
compare equation (11) with the outcome of the certainty equivalent
case:
kˆ1 = kˆ2 = kˆ =
n∑
s=1
ρsAs − (β + γ)
3 (12)
with kˆ = k∗ if and only if both firms choose to be constrained in all
states (i∗ = 0). Otherwise, firms under uncertainty hold more capacity
than what they do in the certain case, with k∗ > kˆ.
Also Pindyck (1988) investigates the impact of uncertainty on firms’
capacity choices, by considering the joint impact of investment irre-
versibility and demand or cost uncertainty.56 The author observes that
the sunkness of investment decisions, when demand is uncertain, should
decrease the optimal level of capacity held by firms. That is, with
volatile demand and irreversible investments, firms should invest less
in capacity than what they would, were investment decisions not sunk.
The third explanation for the existence of excess capacity relies in the
contribution of Fagerberg (1988). This model measures international
competitiveness S(X) as a function of three factors: capacity C, tech-
nological competitiveness (T/Tw), and price competitiveness (P/Pw),
as represented by
S(x) = ACv
(
T
Tw
)e ( P
Pw
)−a
(13)
Total differentiation with respect to time leads to
dS(x)
S(x)
= v
dC
C
+ e
(
dT
T
− dTw
Tw
)
− a
(
dP
P
− dPw
Pw
)
where dC
C
represents the ability to deliver demand and can be further
decomposed into
dC
C
= z
dQ
Q
+ r
dK
K
− l dW
W
(14)
where (dQ/Q) is the growth in technological capability, (dK/K) is
the growth in physical capital, and (dW/W ) is the rate of growth of
demand. This last factor explains how capacity choices and relative in-
ternational competitiveness are related. With fixed capacity, capacity
constrained countries may not be able to deliver and satisfy final de-
mand: under excess demand, a capacity constrained country may not
be able to fully satisfy demand. The country’s total exports may not
vary, but its export share would inevitably goes down as other countries
56 From this perspective, irreversibility affects the investment opportunity cost: the
’Net Present Value’ rule cannot hold in such a context, as the value of the invested
unit must be greater than the purchase and installation costs.
2.4 a theoretical explanation for physical and excess capacity 25
might serve the residual demand. Hence, the model of Fagerberg (1988)
suggests that investments in capacity impact the country’s ability to
serve final demand and consequently its international position. The au-
thor also considers the effect of demand on CU, as it might stimulate
capacity expansion and contribute to international competitiveness.
2.4.2 How?
2.4.2.1 Pure oligopolies vs. mixed oligopolies
In addition to the standard pure duopoly representation, some works
analyze capacity investment decisions in mixed settings. The mixed
framework developed by Stewart (1991) consists of two firms, a profit
maximizing one, and a labour managed one. In this sequential game,
with the incumbent being of either organizational form, the nature
of the entrant affects the incumbent’s entry acceptance or deterrence.
When the incumbent is of the labour managed type, there can be ex-
cessive investment in capacity to deter entry. A similar result emerged
in the framework suggested by Zhang (1993), where the incumbent in
a labour managed industry, under a Leontief production function with
0 elasticity of substitution, carries overcapacity to deter entry. The ro-
bustness of this result has been tested in a note of Haruna (1996), where
a more generic constant returns to scale function is assumed.
The analysis of mixed duopolies can also entail competition between
a public and a private firm. The repeated game by Wen and Sasaki
(2001) can give rise to excess capacity by the public firm, as the re-
sult of a trigger strategy to sustain a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
Moreover, for an endogenous level of capacity, excess capacity can oc-
cur when the public firm is less efficient in the capacity investment
than the private one. In this case, excess capacity is welfare enhanc-
ing as long as the additional benefits from increased output more than
offset the higher investment costs. Differently from this result, Nishi-
mori and Ogawa (2004) find that the public, and non-profit maximizing
firm chooses to be the market follower by choosing to under invest in
capacity, and letting the private, and profit maximizing firm to carry,
strategically, excess capacity. The cost function assumed by Nishimori
and Ogawa (2004) is
Ci(qi,xi) = miqi + (qi − xi)2 (15)
where q is output, x capacity and with i = a, b, for the private and
public firm respectively, and with ma < mb. This cost specification is
the same of Lu and Poddar (2006). Also in this two-stage game, with
the introduction of demand uncertainty, the public firm may prefer
to under-invest in capacity and let the more efficient, private firm to
produce more so as to increase total welfare. Still, this result occurs for
medium realizations of final demand. If demand is in fact sufficiently
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high or low, a symmetric equilibrium, with both firms either under or
over investing in physical capacity, emerges.
2.4.2.2 Pure quantity competition vs. quantity and price competition
In most works, excess capacity rises in pure quantity competition games,
in which firms initially install capacity and then produce by adjust-
ing their output levels. Still, the seminal contribution by Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983), KS, embeds capacity decisions in a context of quan-
tity and price competition to mitigate critics of Cournot model. Their
setting entails competition over homogenous products and includes a
rationing rule that determines the demand of the high-price firm when
the low-cost firm is capacity constrained and is not able to serve the
whole market, as summarized by Martin (1999), and leads to the same
equilibrium of the standard one-shot Cournot game.
Quantity and price competition games also gained attention in the
analysis of collusive agreements. More specifically, colluding firms may
want to carry excess capacity to support collusive agreement and use
this excess capacity as an effective threat for deviations. For instance,
in the first stage of Benoit and Krishna (1985), firms initially make
their investment/capacity decisions, and then engage in an infinite price
competition game. The authors introduce collusion on either prices or
quantities. Firms’ threats reduce initial investment in capacity, ulti-
mately increasing collusion possibilities. Still, all the possible equilibria,
except for the Cournot-Nash one, are characterized by firms carrying
excess capacity, and firms can charge higher prices with respect to the
Cournot-Nash price. Davidson and Deneckere (1990) extend Benoit and
Krishna (1985) to analyze the link between excess capacity and price
collusion, thus ruling out collusive agreement over quantities: in the
first stage, firms choose their capacities, and, in the second stage, they
charge the highest collusive sustainable equilibrium. The authors thus
look at these "semi-collusive" equilibria and observe that firms choose
to carry excess capacity at all equilibria, also in the Cournot-Nash one,
to threaten punishment in case of deviations.57
Acemoglu et al. (2009) study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria
under a KS framework, with efficiency being the ratio between sur-
plus in equilibrium and surplus under the first best scenario. When
doing so, they follow two alternative approaches:58 the "Price of An-
archy" approach, and the "Price of Stability" approach.59 The authors
observe that, also under a very simple linear cost function, the Price
57 Davidson and Deneckere (1990) also observe that firms increase their excess capacity
and collude more frequently as interest rates and costs of capacity fall. Increasing
interest rates reduce losses after deviation, and thus undermine the stability of col-
lusion.
58 Given the fact that there are multiple pure strategy equilibria.
59 In case of multiple equilibria, these two approaches respectively selects the param-
eters of the worst equilibrium, and the best equilibrium for any set of parameters
and then considers the worst-case parameters.
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of Anarchy is zero, suggesting that equilibrium is arbitrarily inefficient.
When implementing the Price of Stability approach, the authors ob-
serve that, under the socially optimum equilibrium, the "maximum in-
efficiency that may result from capacity competition is no more than
approximately 1/6 of the maximal social surplus". Their evidence thus
explains that inefficiencies from choosing a non-optimal equilibrium
may be significant, but under a proper equilibrium, the KS competition
guarantees sufficient efficiency.
In a recent work, Tumennasan (2013) extends KS and includes price-
matching at the second stage. In this context, the effect of price-matching
on the outcome of price competition depends on the magnitude of ca-
pacity constraints: it is relevant in large capacity industries and less sig-
nificant when capacity is low.60 The author also shows that the impact
of price-matching depends on the cost of installing capacity if capaci-
ties are installed simultaneously; if the cost is relevant, price-matching
lowers the equilibrium price.61
2.4.2.3 Static vs. dynamic games
The contributions analyzed so far consist of static games in which com-
petition takes place in a two-stage framework: firms initially install
capacity and then produce, either by choosing output adjustments or
prices. Still, games with capacity may entail a dynamic setting, as in
Abel (1981), where firms must decide, at each stage, their optimal uti-
lization rates of both capital and labour. Under convex adjustment
costs, the investment in each factor62 of production is increasing in the
shadow price of the factor itself. The author also observes that the op-
timal utilization rate is increasing in the capital-labour ratio as long as
the stock of capital increases, holding the labour stock constant.
Excess capacity also emerges in the context of dynamic games, as it
occurs in Besanko et al. (2010). In their infinite horizon set up, firms
face demand uncertainty at each stage of the game, when they must
choose between positive and negative capacity adjustments. Still, one
firm does not know nor what its rivals are going to do nor its rivals’ ad-
justment costs: one firm only knows the rivals’ investment/disinvestment
probability. The model is solved numerically, and two extreme Markov-
perfect equilibria emerge, each with a different swing producer. In one
case, the swing producer is the large firm that acts as a monopolist and
adapts its capacity to meet demand fluctuations. In the other extreme
equilibrium, smaller firms act as swing producers and the large firms
keeps its capacity constant.
60 For intermediate values of capacity, small firms benefit from price-matching as large
firms have less incentives to cut prices.
61 Effects are ambiguous for low installation costs.
62 Which the author refers to as quasi-fixed factors.
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2.5 conclusions
Recent financial downturns and the rise in demand uncertainty seri-
ously threatened the sustainability of industrial capacity investment
decisions. Despite some explanations for excess capacity have already
been suggested, firms still make wrong investment decisions. Hence this
paper stresses the importance of further investigating the factors that
impact capacity installation, so as to endow firms with specifically de-
signed policies and tools.
More specifically, researchers should take into account country and
sector specific elements that play a role during investment decisions. As
far as country specific factors are concerned, future research should look
at the role played by the institutional background.63 Also sector spe-
cific characteristic may play an unquestionable role: this is why future
research should also assess the impact of a sector capital intensity.64
Prevention is (undoubtedly) better than cure; still, future research
should also analyze the consequences of excess capacity, both at the
micro and macro level. On aggregate terms, the impact of negative out-
put gaps on the economic fundamentals should be better singled out.
Future research should also consider the local impact of excess capac-
ity. Persistent excess capacity may trigger plant closure and firm exits:
what are the local consequences of this? What happens, for instance, to
the housing market, in terms of prices, mortgage default rates, sales, as
a local community goes through a plant closure? And how would this
shock affect people’s mobility and migration towards better working
opportunities?
63 To this purpose, Chapter 3 investigates the impact of labour market rigidity on the
accumulation of excess capacity.
64 As preliminarily done in Chapter 4, where the effects of capital intensity and labour
market rigidity are jointly analyzed.
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Abstract
This paper relates excess capacity to the stiffness of labour institutions,
which may contribute to the accumulation of over capacity. In our two-
stage game, two firms in two countries install capacity, under demand
uncertainty, and then adjust output using labour, by producing above
or below capacity, with asymmetric adjustment costs reflecting different
labour regulations. Firms invest in capacity only for positive expecta-
tions over final demand, to minimize the impact of future adjustment
costs. The firm in the high-cost country moves even closer to firms’
expectations, and installs more capacity, to the potential detriment of
the other firm. Hence, under factor substitutability, higher labour costs
make firms prefer output commitment over flexibility.
An alternative technology specification, with capacity-labour comple-
mentarity, is introduced to make the impact of labour costs less severe
and to alleviate the issue of excess capacity.
Keywords: Industrial organization, Oligopoly,
JEL Classification: L, L13.
3.1 introduction
Economic downturns may trigger negative output gaps both at the
aggregate and micro level, and firms experiencing excess capacity re-
duce their CU rate by keeping their plants partially idle.1 Two figures
show the impact of the recent global downturn. Figure 7 reports, at
the aggregate level, potential output,2 output gap,3 and the real GDP
per-capita for a sample of OECD countries.4 The aggregate output gap
1 As an example, in less than 3 years the CU rate of Italian automotive plants dropped
from a break-even level of 80% to 50%, as reported by "‘Il Sole 24 ore"’.
2 Meant as the maximum amount of goods and services that can be produced by an
economy in a given time range.
3 Expressed as the percentage deviation from potential output.
4 Countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Repub-
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has been decreasing since the onset of the financial crises in 2007, and
has been persistently negative since 2009. Figure 8, at the micro level,
displays the Industrial Production Index for a group of European coun-
tries.5 Taking year 2000 as the base year, this Figure clearly shows the
aggregate drop of industrial production in 2008.
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Figure 7: Potential output and output gaps
Persistent negative output gaps and falling production suggest that
the analysis of firm’s investment behavior is far from being complete.
Capacity building is perhaps the most relevant investment decision
firms have to make. What factors do firms take into account at this
preliminary stage? The existing literature traces over-investment in ca-
pacity back to either strategic interaction or demand uncertainty, as
already underlined in Chapter 2.6 Empirical works estimate the im-
pact of labour market rigidity on firms’ capital-labour ratio: Autor
et al. (2007) observe a positive impact of Employment Protection Leg-
islation, EPL, on US firms’ capital-labour ratio, whereas Cingano et al.
(2010) predict a negative relation in financially constrained European
firms. These contrasting evidences have been reconciled by Janiak and
Wasmer (2012), where a generally negative link between capital and
lic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States, from
1990 to 2014.
5 Data on production are gathered from the production volume of country-sector
OECD Stan Database and have been aggregated at the country level. The countries
included in the sample are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United King-
dom from 1990 to 2010.
6 See Spence (1977), Dixit (1979), Brander and Lewis (1988), Spencer and Brander
(1992), and Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997).
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labour emerges. Still, this relation can be positive if the two factors of
production are sufficiently complementary, as displayed in Figure 9.7
Figure 9: EPL and capital-labour ratio, from Janiak and Wasmer (2012)
Notwithstanding these empirical contributions, the existing theoret-
ical literature fails to relate institutional rigidities to firms’ investment
decisions, as explained by Cingano et al. (2010): "while theoretical mod-
7 To contextualize this analysis, they relate the cross-country EPL to the capital-
labour ratio index provided by Caselli (2005). As Figure 9 shows, there is an inverse
U-shaped relationship between EPL and the capital-labour ratio: the capital-labour
ratio is increasing in EPL up to a certain threshold, (EPL equal to 2, where EPL
ranges from 0, absence of labour protection, to 6, maximum protection) as it occurs
for the United Kingdom and the United States, but then it starts decreasing, as
confirmed by Italy and Greece among others.
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els offer clear predictions regarding the effects of adjustment costs on
job turnover, they provide no guidance on the expected effects of em-
ployment protection laws on capital investment, the capital-labour ratio
and productivity".
Our paper fills this gap and suggests a new explanation for excess
capacity. We set up a two-stage quantity competition game between
two firms in two countries: firms initially invest in capacity according
to their expectations over final demand, and, once uncertainty has re-
solved,8 firms employ labour to adjust output.9 Adjustment costs are
country-specific, and we let these asymmetries account for the country
labour market regulation.10 We solve the model by backward induction
to predict the impact of future labour adjustment costs on capacity de-
cisions. In other words, we assess how firms solve the commitment vs.
flexibility trade-off in countries with different labour legislation.
Interestingly, we observe that firms install capacity only if they have
positive expectations over final demand, with firms moving closer to
their expectations so as to minimize the impact of future adjustment
costs. Also, the firm facing higher labour costs has an extra incentive
for over-investing in capacity, and it thus commits to a higher level of
output, potentially to the detriment of the firm in the low-cost country,
that installs less capacity. If final demand is low, that is, if the mag-
nitude of the shock is not too large, the more committed firm gains
higher ex-ante and ex-post profits. For a large shock, the more flexible
firm can adjust more and satisfy a larger residual demand, with positive
repercussions on its own profitability. If expectations over final demand
are instead neutral or negative, firms do not install any capacity and
rather wait for demand realization. These predictions hold under the
assumption of a simple technology, with capacity and labour being
perfect substitutes. In an extension, we relax this assumption and in-
troduce capacity-labour complementarity. This new technology makes
the impact of labour cost differentials less severe and may alleviate the
issue of excess capacity.
3.1.1 Stylized facts
Tables 1 and 2 support the main predictions of our model. Table 1
estimates the impact of labour costs on the formation of potential out-
put in OECD countries,11 and confirms the substitution effect observed
8 We assume that one exogenous shock symmetrically hits demand before the second
stage.
9 Adjustments can be either positive or negative, depending on the shock.
10 From now on, we will be referring to the rigid (flexible) labour country as the
high (low) cost country, to avoid confusion with the output commitment vs. output
flexibility trade-off faced by firms.
11 Using aggregate data.
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in the model,12 with labour costs displaying a positive and significant
effect on the accumulation of production capacity.13 We obtain very
similar results when estimating the impact of wages on the potential
output of the automotive industry,14 as shown in Figure 10.15
Log Potential Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unit labour cost 0.312*** 0.108***
(0.087) (0.107)
Log GDP per capita 0.630*** 0.527***
(0.138) (0.133)
Log labour compensation 0.359*** 0.165***
(0.089) (0.080)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.869 0.935 0.905 0.940
N 610 610 629 629
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1: Potential output and labour costs
In Table 2, we perform a diff-in-diff analysis to evaluate the impact
on aggregate potential output in those OECD countries where EPL
12 The result is robust to two alternative cost specifications: unit labour costs, defined
as the ratio between total labour costs and real output, and the compensation rate.
13 In these specifications, we also control for the effect of the business cycle, and for
demand fluctuations, by including the log of real GDP per-capita, which also shows
a positive and significant effect on the accumulation of potential output.
14 In this analysis, we retrieve data from Indstat 2013 ISIC Rev.3, which provided the
greatest number of observations for the automotive industry. Because of gaps in the
time series, we estimated potential output by means of a capital intensive Cobb-
Douglas production function, using capital formation and employees as production
inputs. This analysis include 142 countries, from 1963 to 2010. Automotive industry
data are at the 2-digit level, and so they include the automotive value chain as a
whole. Still, generally speaking, automotive suppliers tend to be located close to the
final assembly plant: hence, most of the components are designated for the same
country assembly plants and contribute to the country potential output.
15 The two sub-figures respectively display the relation between potential output, in
$100, 000 and total wages and wages per employee, both in $100, 000.
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Figure 10: Potential output and wages in the automotive industry
increased overtime.16 We look at the two-year effect and at the multi-
year effect, estimating the following equations:
Potential_output =β0 + β1t+ β2treated+ β3(t ∗ treated)+
(16)
β4GDP + β5Stock_Capital+ u
Potential_output =β0 + β1dummy_year+ β2treated2+
β3(t ∗ treated2) + β4GDP+
β5Stock_Capital+ u
where t = 1 in 2012 and t = 0 in 1995; treated = 1 if EPL2012 >
EPL1995, and 0 otherwise, dummy_year is the multi-year dummy, and
treated2 = 1 if the annual growth rate of EPL is positive.17 The coef-
ficients of the two interacted terms, t ∗ treated and t ∗ treated2, are
the differences we are interested in. They are both positive and signif-
icant,18 suggesting that countries experiencing an increase in labour
16 EPL substantially considers firing restrictions, hence an increase in EPL imply higher
firing costs.
17 We divided the original measure of potential volume by 10, 000, 000, 000, 000.
18 The coefficient in the multi-period specification (2) is significant at 14%.
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protection also experience an increase in the overall potential output
that can be traced back to changes in labour regulation.
Potential output (1) (2)
t -2.816**
(1.130)
treated 0.000
(.)
t*treated 2.093*
(1.046)
GDP -0.395** -0.157
(0.182) (0.165)
productive capital stock 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
treated2 -0.925
(0.898)
t*treated2 1.756
(1.141)
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes
R2 0.981 0.980
N 51 51
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 2: Diff-in-diff on aggregate potential output
This macro and micro empirical evidence predicts a positive impact
of labour regulation on the accumulation of physical capacity, thus con-
firming the predictions of this paper and stressing the importance of
understanding what’s behind firms’ investment decisions. In addition
to demand uncertainty and strategic interaction, there are indeed other
reasons that explain the rise of excess capacity. This paper in fact pro-
vides a new explanation, that relates physical capacity to the labour
institutional background.19
This paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the main
related literature; Section 3.3 describes the consumption and cost sides
and develops the main model; in Section 3.4 we assume capacity-labour
19 In Annex A.1.1, we perform a probit analysis to evaluate the impact of increases
in labour costs on the probability of incurring negative output gaps . Results show,
once more, the role of labour market rigidity: as labour costs increase, the probability
of experiencing excess capacity increases by 0.55.
36 the theoretical paper
complementarity, and in Section 3.5 we introduce more costly negative
adjustments; last, Section 3.6 draws the main conclusions.
3.2 literature review
This paper heavily relies on the seminal contributions of Spence (1977),
Dixit (1979), Dixit (1980), who investigate the role of strategic interac-
tion within quantity competition. According to Spence (1977), the in-
cumbent’s quantity commitment, which is assumed to be invariant with
respect to the entrant’s decision,20 is an effective entry deterrence tool.
By preserving this constant commitment assumption,21 Dixit (1979)
further examines the incumbent’s entry deterrent output commitment
in a context of product differentiation. In an extension to this model,
the author also studies how an excessive commitment would credibly
threaten the inactive firm, by intimidating it with a predatory output
in case of entry. In his seminal contribution, Dixit (1980) allows for
ex-post adjustments.22 In this way, the established firm could alter the
initial conditions of the game23 by changing the post-entry structure
of its marginal costs.
The implications of product differentiation within quantity compe-
tition have been further analyzed by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983),
who extend Dixit (1980) by embedding product differentiation in a two
stage game framework: firms simultaneously set their capacities and,
once aware of the competitor’s optimal investment, engage in price
competition. The fundamental prediction of this model is that equi-
librium is not only unique but it corresponds exactly to the standard
Cournot outcome.
The role of output commitment has also been analyzed by Spencer
and Brander (1992), who look at how firms solve the commitment-
flexibility trade-off in a context of economic uncertainty.24 They con-
sider alternative settings of oligopolistic competition to show that de-
mand uncertainty affects the way firms solve this trade-off, and they
stress the importance of pre-commitment as an entry-deterrent strat-
egy.
This trade-off has also been analyzed by Dewit et al. (2013), with a
focus on firms’ location decisions. They consider in fact a two-period
setting, in which firms initially have to choose where to produce and
then engage in either quantity or price competition. At the time of
picking their production location, firms must choose between a country
with a flexible labour legislation and a country with a rigid employ-
20 That is, the quantity commitment is constant even in case of no-entry in the second
stage.
21 Also known as the Sylos Postulate.
22 Even though the only admitted adjustment is positive, so that investments can only
increase.
23 Which are however assumed to be exogenous.
24 Modeled as an exogenous, demand additive, shock.
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ment protection. The underlying level of employment protection makes
employment adjustment more or less costly: as a consequence, the au-
thors interpret the employment levels chosen by firms as a source of
commitment. As far as quantity competition is concerned, Dewit et al.
(2013) observe, similarly to our result, that the inflexible location is
strategically more attractive than the flexible one: employment, acting
as a source of commitment, enables the firm in the rigid country to
attain a greater market share once production effectively takes place,
to the detriment of the firm in the flexible country. Results are instead
reversed when price competition is assumed, since strategic pricing by
the firm in the flexible country harms the firm in the rigid location.25
Lu and Poddar (2006) set up a two-stage quantity competition game
between a public and a private firm. Under demand uncertainty, the
authors look at the decision to under or over invest in physical capacity
as the outcome of strategic interaction. In their analysis, there is a sym-
metric result as long as demand is relatively high or low;26 if instead
demand realization is medium, there is an asymmetric outcome and
the public firm, that is maximizing total welfare, is under investing in
capacity, leaving a greater market share to the private firm, which is
more efficient from a marginal cost point of view.
Besanko et al. (2010) embed the analysis of positive and negative ca-
pacity adjustments in a context of dynamic oligopolies. In their frame-
work, two firms face two types of uncertainty: an exogenous one, related
to the state of demand, and an endogenous one, reflecting strategic in-
teraction and taking into account the rival’s adjustment probability.27
In their numerical analysis, multiple equilibria exist: at one extreme,
one large firm would adapt its capacity to meet demand fluctuations,
whereas at the other extreme only smaller firms would change their
capacities, thus acting as swing producers.
3.3 the model
Under free trade,28 global demand for the homogenous good x is rep-
resented by the following inverse linear expected demand function:
p = a− x+E(ε) (17)
where ε is a demand additive29 and exogenous shock, and x = xi + xj
is total output. The magnitude of the shock is ε in either states, but
25 In their framework, the effects of strategic pricing are ruled out if both firms choose
the flexible country.
26 Both firms under invest for a high demand realization and they both over invest for
a low demand realization.
27 Note that firms can only observe the rival’s adjustment probability, not the adjust-
ment in capacity itself.
28 We include this free-trade assumption to rule out any effect other than the impact
of strategic interaction, demand uncertainty and cost asymmetries. Future research
may include transport costs with differentiated products.
29 As in Spencer and Brander (1992) and Dewit et al. (2013).
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it is positive in the good one and negative in the bad one, which occur
with probability γ and 1− γ respectively.30
The expected value of ε is given by
E(ε) = ε(2γ − 1)

> 0⇐⇒ γ ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
= 0⇐⇒ γ = 12
< 0⇐⇒ γ ∈
[
0, 12
) (18)
In this framework, there are two factors of production: physical capac-
ity, chosen in the first stage and sunk afterward,31 and labour, which
is fixed and is used in the second stage.32
In this baseline specification, factors are assumed to be substitutes, so
that no particular labour requirement to install capacity, and vice versa,
is introduced.33
Costs are exogenous: they are symmetric in the first stage (the uni-
tary investment cost is c in both countries), and country specific in
the second stage. In our framework, the second stage adjustment cost
θi represents the country’s degree of labour market regulation: in the
good state, it reflects the overtime wage for producing beyond capac-
ity, whereas in the bad state it represents the cost of keeping the plant
idle and laying-off workers.34 Hence, higher adjustment costs can be
thought of as a proxy for more stringent labour regulations.
Total costs are given by
C(ki, qi) = ck2i + θiqi (19)
where ki is the initial investment in physical capacity,35 and qi is the
second stage output adjustment, either positive or negative. In the
remaining of the section, we will assume that labour is more costly in
country 1, that is:
Assumption A In country 1, there is a more stringent labour regula-
tion, so that second stage adjustment costs are greater in either state,
with θ1 > θ2 for ∀x1,x2 and ∀ε.
and so we will refer to country 1 (2) as the high-cost (low-cost) country.
In this baseline specification, we also assume that positive and negative
adjustments are equally costly, regardless of the adjustment sign. In an
30 Future work should also include a discrete distribution for ε ∈
{
εBad, 0, εGood
}
.
31 In the second stage, once demand has realized, capacity cannot be expanded or
dismantled. In the bad state, firms can only keep the plant idle.
32 In this partial equilibrium analysis, the number of workers cannot change, and so
firms cannot hire new workers in the good state.
33 In section 3.4, we introduce capacity-labor complementarity assuming that each
installed unit of capacity requires a given endowment of labour to be fully operative.
34 In a previous version of this paper we also included asymmetric investment costs, c.
For sake of interest, we decided to introduce asymmetries in the second stage only.
35 We can think of this investment as an output commitment chosen ex-ante by firms.
In this framework, we consider a quadratic investment cost. We initially considered
a CRS technology, but to no avail.
3.3 the model 39
t = 1 Shock ε t = 2
Firms invest in capacity choosing ki Firms observe final demand and
decide the output adjustment qi
t
Figure 11: Timing of the model
extension to this model, we conjecture that negative adjustments, and
thus lay-off costs, are more expensive,36 and we evaluate the new impact
of labour institutions on firms’ output commitment. As displayed in
Figure 11, this two-stage game is structured as follows: in the first stage,
firms must choose their optimal level of physical capacity according
to equation (17), that is, according to their expectations over final
demand. Once uncertainty has resolved, firms observe final demand and
eventually produce by playing Cournot competition: what they choose
is the optimal level of adjustment qi. Since labour is fixed and capital
is sunk, firms choose these short-run output adjustments by adapting
their labour endowments along the intensive margin: positive (negative)
adjustments require in fact above (below) capacity production, which
in turn requires overtime wages (lay-off schemes) as capacity cannot be
increased (dismantled).
3.3.1 Equilibrium analysis
The model is solved through backward induction. Starting from the
second stage, we derive the good and bad state optimal adjustments,
solving37
max
qi,g
pii,g =(a+ ε− (ki + qi,g)− xj,g)(ki + qj,g)− θiqi,g − ck2i
(20)
max
qi,b
pii,b =(a− |ε| − (ki − |qi,b|)− xj,b))(ki − |qi,b|)− θiqi,b − ck2i
where xj,g = kj + qj,g and xj,b = kj − |qj,b|. Good and bad state reac-
tion functions are
qi,g =
a+ ε− θi − kj − qj,g
2 − ki
|qi,b| = ki − kj + |ε| − a− θi − |qj,b|2
and equilibrium adjustments are
36 In line with the interpretation of EPL.
37 In case of a negative shock, the derivative with respect to qi yields −signum(qi)((a+
θi − 2ki − kj + |ε|+ 2|qi|+ |qj |)), but since qi < 0 the signum = −1.
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qgi,g =
a+ ε− 2θi + θj
3 − ki (21)
|q∗i,b| = ki −
θj + |ε| − 2θi − a
3 (22)
In the bad state, excess capacity is the gap between potential output
and effective adjustment, that is ki− |qi| = a+ 2θi − |ε| − θj3 , which is
increasing in the adjustment cost θi.38 Thus, an increase in θi increases
the share of capacity that is idle, and ultimately contributes to the
generation of excess capacity. This effect is in line with the empirical
evidence in Chapter 4, of a positive link between EPL and capacity
under-utilization.39
In this paper instead, we look at the impact of θi on the choice of ki.
Before the realization of demand, each firm maximizes its own expected
profits, in anticipation of its optimal adjustments in either state, given
by equation (22):
max
ki
E(pii) = γE(pii,g) + (1− γ)E(pii,b) (23)
where Prob(ε > 0) = γ. The optimal investment in physical capacity
is thus
ki =
θiz
2c (24)
where z ≡ (2γ − 1). Recalling the expected value of ε from equation
(18), we can distinguish these different cases:
1. If good and bad shocks are equivalently likely to occur, with γ =
1/2, then E(ε) = 0 and firms do not install any capacity, with
ki = 0: they rather wait for demand realization as they expect
final demand to be equal to p = a− x;
2. If instead γ is sufficiently high, with γ > 1/2, then E(ε) > 0
and firms install capacity, with ki > 0, and take their output
commitment decision. In this case, they decide to move closer to
E(ε), but the firm in the high-cost country will move closer to
minimize the impact of its greater future adjustment costs. In
other words, k1 > k2 for θ1 > θ2;
38 In either state, adjustments negatively depend on the impact of labour costs. This is
intuitive in the good state, with
∂qi,g
∂θi
< 0. In the bad state, since qi,b is in absolute
values, the final effect is negative, after substituting the final level of capacity ki:
as labour costs increase, the adjustment is more and more negative. Hence during
economic downturns, firms, in addition to overcapacity, will also experience lower
production levels, in line with the predictions of Chapter 4.
39 Whereas this paper looks at the effect of EPL on the ex-ante investment decision,
Chapter 4 looks at the effect of labour protection on the ex-post adjustment process,
taking into account also the irreversibility of former investment decisions.
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3. If instead γ < 1/2, firms have negative expectations over final
demand, and do not accumulate any new capacity and wait for
demand realization: this result does not imply firms’ exit, rather
it states that firms prefer to be totally flexible and incur only
second stage adjustment costs.40
In this model, the shock hits the two countries symmetrically, and the
two firms, when positive and negative adjustments are equally costly,
will both solve the trade-off between commitment and flexibility in the
same way.41
Proposition 1 summarizes these results:
Proposition 1 In the baseline model, where positive and negative ad-
justment costs are equal to θi, with θ1 > θ2, both firms invest in capac-
ity only if they expect with a sufficient probability an economic upturn.
Moreover, firm 1, in the high cost country, invests more in physical ca-
pacity than firm 2, to minimize the impact of future adjustment costs,
and may experience higher excess capacity during economic downturns.
Proposition 1 also suggests that firms substitute labour with capacity
when solving their trade-off between output commitment and output
flexibility,42 and explains that, within this framework, as labour costs
increase, firms prefer output commitment. Throughout this section we
will assume what follows:
Assumption B The probability of a positive shock γ is large enough,
with γ ∈ ( 12 , 1], so that firms always have positive expectations over
final demand and eventually install some physical capacity.
The ’no-capacity’ scenario, with γ = 1/2 is described in 3.3.2.43
To conclude this section, we look at firms’ profits, both ex-ante and
ex-post, to assess under which conditions over-investment in capacity
pays-off. In expectations, each firm gets
E(pii) =
1
36c [4c(a
2 + z) + 9z2θ2i + 8acz(zε− 2θi + θj)] (25)
and it is easy to show that, under Assumptions A and B, E(pi1) > E(pi2)
only if final demand is low, with
a+ ε <
(θ1 + θ2)(3z2 + 4c)
8cz
40 Firms wait for demand realization and eventually produce in-house or outsource
production.
41 The introduction of asymmetric demand shocks might imply mixed scenarios, with
one firm choosing commitment and the other firm preferring total output flexibility.
42 As in Spencer and Brander (1992).
43 Future research should also include the consequences of negative expectations over
former investment decisions: this analysis may require a dynamic model in which,
at each stage, firms can destroy their already installed capacity depending on their
expectations over final demand.
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As a consequence, the rigid firm can exploit its greater investment in
capacity and gain higher expected profits only if final demand is not
too high, so only over a limited range of output values. If this is not
the case, the other, more flexible firm adjusts more and gains higher
expected profits.
To gain also an ex-post perspective, we look at profits after the res-
olution of uncertainty. Good state profits are represented by
pigi =
4a2c− 9(−2+ z)zθ2i + 8acω+ 4cω2
36c
with ω ≡ |ε| − 2θi + θj . Again, we see that firm 1, in the high-cost
country, gains higher good state profits as long as final demand is not
too high, with
a+ ε <
(θ1 + θ2)(4+ 3z(2− z))
8
Bad state profits of firm i are given by
pibi =
4a2c− 9z(2+ z)θ2i − 8acω+ 4cω2
36c
which are positive only if initial investment costs are large enough, with
c >
9z(2+ z)θ2i
4(−a+ ω)2 .
In the bad state, the more committed firm can gain greater bad state
profits only if final demand is large enough (that is, if the magnitude
of the negative shock is not too large), with
a− |ε| > (θ1 + θ2)(4− 6z − 3z
2)
8
If instead the drop in demand is large enough, the flexible firm will gain
more. This result is more in line with the predictions of Cingano et al.
(2010), where financially constrained firms invest less. In our framework,
the realization of the bad state may act as a financial constraint on
firms. To avoid incurring negative profits, firms prefer to under invest
in capacity, as the excess of capacity may imply additional costs that
in turn also increase the probability of bankruptcy.
Proposition 2 In the baseline model, the more committed firm gains
more, both ex-ante and ex-post, if the magnitude of the shock ε is not too
large. In this way, the firm can gain from its higher initial commitment.
If the magnitude of the shock is instead sufficiently large, the flexible
firm, with lower second stage costs, can adjust more and achieve greater
profits.
As a last step, we compare firm i’s profits in either states, that is:
pii,g − pii,b = 9zθ
2
i + 4acω
9c
with good state profits being greater than bad state profits for ω > 0.
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3.3.2 Commitment vs. flexibility
As previously discussed, firms invest in capacity only if they expect with
sufficient probability an increase in final demand (ε > 0). Otherwise,
firms do not exit but rather wait for demand realization and produce,
either on their own or outsourcing, incurring only second stage costs.
So, as long as γ ∈
(
0, 12
]
, ki = 0 and firms’ expected profits are
E(pii)|ki=0 =
1
9 ((1− γ)(a− εz − 2θi + θj)
2+
γ(a+ εz − 2θi + θj)2)
To understand how the trade-off between commitment and flexibility
is solved, we compare expected profits with and without capacity:
E(pii)|ki>0 −E(pii)|ki=0 =
9z2θ2i + 16c(1− γ)(2θi − θj)(a− zε)
36c
Recalling Assumption A, we must distinguish between firm 1 and 2.
Firm 1 is better off under output commitment as long as the magnitude
of the shock ε is small, with |ε| < a/z.44 Interestingly, the trade-off
for firm 2 depends also on the impact of cost asymmetries and on the
relative labour cost differentials: if these are not so pronounced, and the
two countries charge similar labour costs, output commitment decisions
by the two firms are relatively similar, and so also firm 2 is better-off
under output commitment. As the cost gap becomes more and more
pronounced, installed capacities may differ substantially between the
two firms, and firm 2 may be better-off under output flexibility. We can
in fact distinguish these two cases:
1. Firm 2 is better off under output commitment if the shock is small
(large), with |ε| < a/z (|ε| > a/z), and if the cost asymmetries
are not (are) pronounced, with θ2 ∈ (θ1/2, θ1) (θ2 ∈ (0, θ1/2));
2. If instead the shock is small (large) and cost asymmetries are (are
not) pronounced, then firm 2 gains higher expected profits with
no output commitment.
3.3.3 Comparative statics
We perform comparative statics on expected profits to assess how costs
affect the ex-ante profitability of each firm. As far as the first stage cost
c is concerned, the effect on expected profits is negative, with
∂E(pii)
∂c
= −θ
2
i (−z)2
4c2 < 0⇐⇒ ∀c, θi, γ > 0
44 In line with Proposition 2
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For both firms, higher investment costs imply in fact a lower level of
capacity installation, which is detrimental to expected profitability as
it leads to lower market shares. Obviously, the impact is less severe for
the firm in the low-cost country.
The effect of θi on E(pii) is positive if final demand is not large enough,
that is
∂E(pii)
∂θi
> 0⇔ a+ ε < 9(z)
2θi + 8c(2θi − θj)
8cz
That is, an increase in adjustment costs increases expected profitabil-
ity, provided that final demand is not too large: firm 1 would in fact
commit more, but the other firm, whose adjustment costs are lower and
constant, may adjust more and satisfy a greater share of the market.
As a last step, we investigate the effect of an increase in the rival’s
adjustment costs on the ex-ante profitability of firm i. Interestingly, θj
has a negative impact on E(pii), provided that θj is sufficiently small:
∂E(pii)
∂θj
=
2
9 (z(a+ ε)− 2θi + θj)
which is negative for 0 < θj < 2θi − z(a+ ε). As θj increases up to a
certain threshold, the output commitment of firm j increases, too, and
the residual demand and expected profitability of firm i inevitably go
down. This result confirms how firms strategically choose capacity to
increase their expected market shares, at the expense of the rival firm.
These results combined explain that the impact of strategic inter-
action varies with the impact of cost asymmetries. Commitment ki is
increasing in the firm’s own labour costs, and is unaffected by the ri-
val’s ones. Still, the consequences of commitment, in terms of expected
profits, are increasing in the firm’s own labour cost, and decreasing in
the rival’s one, provided that both final demand and θj are sufficiently
small.
3.4 capacity-labour complementarity
The baseline model predicts that, under factor substitutability, higher
labour costs trigger over-investment in capacity. In this section, we
consider an alternative cost specification that rather implies capacity-
labour complementarity to assess whether a more complicated technol-
ogy may alleviate the impact of labour costs and reduce excess capacity
concerns:
Ci(ki, qi) = (c+ hi)k2i + qi(θi + φhi) (26)
According to equation (26), capacity installation also requires a labour
component, hi, to be fully operative. This labour component also enters
the second stage of production, magnified by the effect of a symmetric
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parameter φ ≥ 1 that captures investment irreversibility and affects
unitary adjustment costs.45 The new equilibrium level of capacity is:
kComplementarityi =
z(θi + φhi)
2(c+ hi)
(27)
First of all, we want to compare Equation (27) with the baseline capac-
ity,46 and we observe that:
1. Interestingly, the hi parameter does not affect this comparison;
2. kSubstitutabilityi > k
Complementarity
i if θi > cφ, that is, if the adjust-
ment cost is greater than the investment cost, weighted by the
irreversibility parameter.
As long as θi > cφ, we observe an additional effect: ki is decreasing in
hi. As the factors of firm i become more complements, firm i reduces
its capacity and prefers to stay more flexible:47
∂kComplementarityi
∂hi
=
z(−θi + cφ)
2(chi)2
< 0⇐⇒ θi > cφ
Proposition 3 Under factor complementarity, both firms are going to
invest less in capacity than under the substitutability scenario, provided
that θi > cφ, that is, provided that it is more costly to adjust output
than to invest in capacity.
Finally, we compare capacity decisions, under the complementarity as-
sumption, of firm 1 and 2, and we observe that the firm in the high-cost
country is, once more, going to install a higher level of capacity, with
kc1 > k
c
2, as long as
1. Either
θ1
θ2
>
h1
h2
(28)
2. or
θ1
θ2
<
h1
h2
, θ1 > θ2,h1 > h2 and c >
θ2h1 − θ1h2
(θ1 − θ2) + φ(h1 − h2) (29)
45 In Chapter 4 the joint effect of labour market rigidity and capital irreversibility is
taken into account. Also, the effect of an increase in labour rigidity on the accumu-
lation of excess capacity is stronger in more capital intensive industries.
46 ki =
zθi
2c
47 It is easy to show that, also in this new version, excess capacity during economic
downturns is
1
3 (a− ε+ 2θi − θj + 2hiφ− h2φ)
which is increasing in both θi, as in the baseline model, and in factor complemen-
tarity, hi.
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In the baseline model, we observed that the condition θ1 > θ2 was
sufficient to make firm 1 install more capacity. Here instead, the intro-
duction of a sufficient degree of capacity-labour complementarity may
alter the outcome. Firm 1 invests more if its relative adjustment cost
is greater than its complementarity requirement, relatively to firm 2. If
this condition does not hold, firm 1 invests more if the investment cost
c is large enough, as in equation (29).48
3.5 shock specific adjustment costs
In this section, we assume that it is more costly to make negative adjust-
ments to capacity,49 and we assess whether this assumption affect firms’
behavior. To this purpose, we introduce two different cost structures:
in the first one, in equation (30), we preserve our linear adjustment
setting and let the distinction between good and bad state costs apply
only to firm 2. This analysis stresses the relevance of cost asymmetries
in the strategic interaction process and predicts that the firm incurring
a more costly negative adjustment needs a greater γ to commit, and
will also commit less. In the second approach instead, in equation (33),
we want to understand firms’ risk aversion by introducing quadratic
adjustment costs (in the bad state only) in each firm’s cost structure.
The predictions of this specification are very similar to those of the
baseline model.
3.5.1 Negative and positive adjustment specific costs
In this new specification, we let costs of firm 1 vary with the state of
the world, with
C(k1, q1)|ε>0 = ck21 + βq1 C(k1, q1)|ε<0 = ck21 + θ1q1 (30)
with θ1 > β. The cost structure of firm 2 is C(k2, q2) = ck22 + βq2, re-
gardless of the sign ε. The model is solved following the same approach
of the baseline specification. The optimal investments in capacity are
k1 =
γ(β + θ1)− θ1
2c k2 =
βz
2c (31)
As before, k2 is positive only for γ >
1
2 ; k1 is positive for γ >
θ1
β + θ1
>
1
2 .
50 In this specification, firms’ strategies are not symmetric: we could
have a mixed scenario with one firm committing and the other one not.
48 If we assume that h1 = h2 = h, then we have, once again, k1 > k2 for θ1 > θ2.
49 It is in fact realistic to assume that it is more costly to fire than to pay overtime
wages.
50 Given the greater negative adjustment cost, firm 2 needs a greater probability of a
positive shock to invest.
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Under this new assumption, we also have a different result with respect
to the baseline model. Now, it is firm 2 that is going to invest more in
capacity. Hence, the risk of incurring higher firing costs affects firm’s
behavior. We also look at the difference in firm 1’s strategy: not only
in this new context is firm 1 going to invest less than firm 2, but it is
also going to invest less than its decision in the baseline specification:
kBaseline1 − kextended1 =
γ(θ1 − β)
2c
which is positive, since we assumed θ1 > β. Hence, when negative
adjustments are more costly, firms are going to invest less in capacity.
They in fact prefer to wait for demand realization and eventually adjust.
The baseline model predicts that over-investment in capacity pays-off
in terms of expected profits. Once again, overcapacity pays-off if and
only if the magnitude of the shock is not large enough: as the magnitude
increases, the more flexible firm can gain more by adjusting more.
E(pi2)−E(pi1) > 0⇔ ε < 8ac+ (3+ 4c− 9γ)β + θ1(3+ 4c− 3γ)8cz
Firm 2 also always achieves higher good state profits, but in the bad
state, it does so if and only if final demand is relatively low, with
a− ε < 3γ2(θ1+3β)−(θ1+β)(3+4c)8c .
3.5.2 Quadratic adjustment costs
This analysis adds to the baseline cost specification a quadratic cost
component that both firms must pay in case of negative adjustments.
In this setting, firms face similar cost structures, but these vary with
the realization of final demand, with
C(qi, ki)ε>0 = θiqi + ck2i (32)
C(qi, ki)ε<0 = θi|qi|+ α(ki − |qi|)2 + ck2i (33)
where α(ki − |qi|)2 is the component related to the distance between
potential and actual output. The optimal level of physical capacity is
the same of the baseline model:
ki =
θiz
2c
That is, despite the quadratic adjustment cost, capacity is going to be
installed if and only if Prob(ε > 0) > 12 . To extend our analysis, we
look at the impact of quadratic adjustment costs on the ex-ante and
ex-post profitability, and results are in line with Proposition 2.
3.6 conclusions
This paper contributes to the quantity competition literature by relat-
ing firms’ investment decisions, in terms of physical capacity, to the
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institutional background in which firms operate.
To do this, we set up a two-stage game with demand uncertainty
where firms initially install capacity according to expected demand, and
adjust their output levels once demand has realized. In this model, there
are two factors of production: physical capacity and labour, needed to
adjust production targets. We introduce second stage cost asymmetries
by formalizing different institutional regimes, meant as rigid or flexible
labour markets, to assess their impact on capacity building.
This model predicts that firms install capacity only if they have posi-
tive expectations over final demand; if expectations are instead neutral
or negative, they do not commit at all and wait for demand realization.
Positive investments in capacity allow firms to move closer to their
expectations, and the firm facing higher adjustment costs moves even
closer, so as to minimize the impact of future adjustment costs. Hence,
the firm in the high-cost country has an additional incentive to invest
more in physical capacity, potentially to the detriment of the more flex-
ible firm: if in fact the magnitude of the shock is not too large, larger
commitment pays-off in terms of greater profitability.
To assess whether these results stem from the assumption of per-
fect substitutability between capacity and labour, we consider an alter-
native cost specification with capacity-labour complementarities. Pro-
vided that adjustment costs are greater than installation costs, when
factors are complements, both firms choose to invest less in capacity
than before.
This model does not account for the social implications of excess ca-
pacity. Future research should thus include a welfare point of view and
derive the socially optimal level of physical capacity. The capacity cho-
sen by a Social Planner would then be compared with what observed
in this paper, and with the level agreed upon by two colluding firms.
Also, future work should entail the analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
(M&A) and the reallocation of existing capacity.
Last but not least, demand uncertainty and firms’ investment deci-
sions could be embedded in the framework of collective wage bargaining:
rather then choosing investment levels, firms can in fact commit also
by choosing their optimal labour endowment. Following the approach
of Dhillon and Petrakis (2002), we could consider a wage bargaining
setting under demand uncertainty to see whether the bargaining pro-
cess and the resulting wage are affected by firms’ inability to predict
final demand.
4
THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
AND INVESTMENT IRREVERS IB IL ITY ON
EXCESS CAPACITY
Abstract
Exploiting a country-sector panel of European firms, we estimate the
joint effect of labour protection and capital irreversibility on the excess
of physical capacity, meant as the share of installed capacity that is not
exploited by firms.
We observe that an increase in the protection of regular workers raises
excess capacity, and this effect is stronger in sectors where capital is
more irreversible.
Our result is robust to the estimation of a diff-in-diff analysis: we ob-
serve that countries experiencing a toughening of labour restrictions
also tend to experience higher excess capacity in the long run.
Keywords: Industrial organization, Labour economics
JEL Classification: J, L.
4.1 introduction
Excess capacity reports the deviation of actual output from what could
be potentially achieved by an economic system or by a production unit.
The first analysis on excess capacity date back to the late 1970s; still,
excess capacity became, once again, a major concern after the 2009
financial turmoil. The credit crunch and the inevitable fall in consump-
tion levels revealed in fact how exposed the real side of an economy is
to the financial one, and, fore and foremost, how these two elements
are so deeply related. Macroeconomists recently started looking at the
effect of the financial cycle on the creation and destruction of potential
output,1 that is, the maximum volume of production a given economy
can achieve.2 On the theoretical side, many works blamed strategic
interaction and demand uncertainty as responsible for the rise in over-
capacity.3
1 At the aggregate level.
2 See, for instance, Furceri and Mourougane (2012), Bijapur (2012), and Benati (2012).
3 See, among others, Spence (1977) and Dixit (1979). For a more detailed overview of
the existing literature, see Chapter 2.
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Figure 12 reports potential output and output gap4 for a sample
of European manufacturing industries.5 Negative output gaps account
for excess capacity, with actual production falling well below potential
output, and the output gap for the countries considered has been per-
sistently negative since 2008.
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Figure 12: Potential output and output gaps
Table 3 suggests that also a capital intensive industry, such as the
Automotive one, is not exempted from negative output gaps and excess
capacity: in some countries the CU6 rate dropped sharply. In Italy, for
instance, the average plant CU rate fell from 78% to 54% in less than
five years, whereas in the United Kingdom and in Germany it was sta-
ble at 92% and 90% respectively.7 Hence, Table 3 suggests the presence
of some country-specific factors that may explain different investment
decisions and capacity exploitation rates.
Available evidence mainly investigates excess capacity at the aggregate
level. To distinguish our work, we adopt a more fragmented approach
and focus on excess capacity at the country-sector level to understand
which sectors, in which countries, tend to experience higher excess ca-
pacity. Are firms too myopic when setting up their production facilities,
or are there any other factors that make them invest too much in physi-
cal capacity? Also, why do firms react so differently, in terms of output
adjustments, to a demand volatility?
4 Potential output is the maximum volume of production that can be achieved for
given input factors and prices, whereas actual output represents the business cycle,
and is defined as the difference between potential and actual production volumes.
5 This data come from the OECD Stan Database. Countries included are: Austria,
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Slovenia, and Sweden, from 1990 to 2009. To retrieve potential output, we
dropped missing values and applied the HP-filter, for annual data, to the volume of
production, in million units.
6 Defined as the ratio between actual and potential output.
7 From Il Sole 24 ore.
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Country CU 2007 CU 2011 CU 2012 Total capacity
Germany 89% 89% 90% 6.4 million
France 74% 67% 60% 3.3 million
Spain 86% 79% 70% 3.0 million
Russia 72% 69% 70% 2.7 million
United Kingdom 93% 87% 92% 1.6 million
Italy 78% 53% 54% 1.4 million
Turkey 90% 79% 68% 1.4 million
Poland 95% 86% 70% 1.2 million
Czech Republic 90% 92% 84% 6.4 million
Table 3: Actual and output production,
European Automotive Industry
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 identifies a new
explanation for excess capacity, and explains, with an ex-ante perspec-
tive, the impact of labour restrictions on firms’ irreversible investment
decisions, and shows that firms in rigid labour markets tend to invest
more in physical capacity,8 thus running the risk of incurring overca-
pacity during economic downturns. This model also shows, in line with
the empirical findings of this Chapter, that the gap between actual and
potential output is increasing in labour costs.
This empirical Chapter extends this framework and estimates the
impact of EPL,9 on the short-run excess capacity, proxied by the share
on unexploited physical capacity,10 to predict the ex-post consequences
of labour protection on firms’ short-run output adjustments.
Cingano et al. (2010) condense this interpretation: "Typically, the
presence of dismissal costs raises firms’ adjustments costs. For this rea-
son firms may have incentives to distort their production choices toward
the more flexible input, thus substituting labour for capital". This state-
ment confirms the theoretical results, and illustrates the transmission
channel that impacts both output adjustments and capacity under-
utilization rates. In light of this statement, and given the theoretical
foundation, we expect excess capacity to be increasing in the level of
EPL.
Cunat and Melitz (2012) provide an alternative description of the
consequences of labour protection, as labour market rigidities impede
8 This result is also due to strategic interaction, in line with the Industrial Organiza-
tion literature: firms over invest in capacity, and thus commit to a higher level of
output to gain a higher market share.
9 The OECD measure for EPL substantially measures firing costs and procedures,
for both individual and collective dismissals. This measure only partially captures
the degree of labour rigidity: hence, future analysis should also include alternative
indicators, such as minimum wage policies.
10 Obtained from the CU rate.
52 the empirical paper
the reallocation of workers toward their most efficient use. This addi-
tional constraint may consequently affect factor productivity and may
lead to a sub-optimal rate of CU.
Throughout this paper, we consider the joint effect of EPL, an exoge-
nous constraint at the country-level, and capital intensity, an endoge-
nous constraint reflecting the sectoral sunkness and irreversibility of
former capacity decisions. As stressed by Pindyck (1988), irreversibil-
ity is an industry-specific characteristic: "Irreversibility usually arises
because capital is industry- or firm-specific, that is, it cannot be used
in a different industry or by a different firm. A steel plant, for exam-
ple, is industry-specific. It can only be used to produce steel, so if the
demand for steel falls, the market value of the plant will fall. Although
the plant could be sold to another steel company, there is likely to be
little gain from doing so, so the investment in the plant must be viewed
as a sunk cost". In light of this statement, we expect a stronger effect
of EPL in sectors with more irreversible investment decisions. Figure 13
reports the deviation of actual from potential output of the most and
least capital intensive manufacturing industries,11 and shows how the
two capital intensive industries considered, namely the chemicals and
motor industries, tend to be affected by more volatile business cycles.
To disentangle the effect of EPL, we distinguish between total restric-
tions, restrictions on temporary and regular workers. As far as capital
sunkness is concerned, we use the time invariant capital intensity of
the corresponding US manufacturing industry, following the approach
of Rajan and Zingales (1998).
The impact of EPL on excess capacity is somehow ambiguous, as
its sign depends on the type of protection considered: the effect of
total EPL is negative, but this is mainly driven by the protection on
temporary workers. More interestingly, our estimates predict that the
effect of regular worker protection is detrimental to excess capacity, a
result which is aligned to the predictions of Chapter 3. The opposed
effects of these two type of protections reveal different capacity-labour
complementarities between skilled-unskilled (regular-temporary) work-
ers and capital.12 The marginal effect of EPL is instead unambiguous:
11 In this stylized fact analysis, we use the OECD Stan Database. Capital intensity is
defined as the ratio between the formation of capital (volume) and total employment,
for the countries above mentioned. The industries included in the Stan Database are
classified at the ISIC Rev.3 2 digit level, and include: Food products and beverages;
Tobacco products; Textiles; Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur; Leather,
leather products and footwear; Wood and products of wood and cork; Pulp, paper
and paper products; Printing and publishing; Coke, refined petroleum products and
nuclear fuel; Chemicals and chemical products; Rubber and plastics products; Other
non-metallic mineral products; Basic metals; Fabricated metal products, except ma-
chinery and equipment; Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.; Office, accounting and
computing machinery; Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.; Radio, television
and communication equipment; Medical, precision and optical instruments; Motor
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Other transport equipment; Manufacturing n.e.c..
12 Protection of regular workers increases excess capacity, since firms will hire less work-
ers to avoid additional dismissal costs. But with a lower workforce, firms can exploit
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Figure 13: Excess capacity: capital vs. labour intensive labour industries
an increase in labour protection is more detrimental, in terms of excess
capacity, to capital intensive industries.13
Our results are robust to the estimation of a diff-in-diff analysis: we
observe that countries experiencing a toughening of labour restrictions
also tend to experience higher excess capacity over time.
This work is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the related
literature, Section 4.3 describes the empirical strategy and the sample
structure, Section 4.4 shows the main results and predictions, Section
4.5 reports some robustness analysis, that also include a difference-
in-difference regression specification, and Section 4.6 draws the main
conclusions and potential policy implications.
4.2 literature review
The existing literature on excess capacity is mainly theoretical. The
seminal contributions by Spence (1977) and Dixit (1979) identify ex-
less their physical capacity, and this effect is more severe for industries with more
irreversible investments. Instead, as the protection of temporary workers increases,
excess capacity tends to go down. This phenomenon can be explained as follows:
as EPL on temporary workers increases, firms will employ less atypical workers and
will substitute them with regular, permanent workers, with positive repercussions
on CU.
13 As an extension to the main analysis, we investigate the relation between excess
capacity and demand uncertainty. More specifically, we look at which industries, in
terms of demand fluctuations, suffer more from an increase in employment protec-
tion and we find that an increase in the protection of temporary workers is more
detrimental, with respect to excess capacity, in industries facing a higher demand
volatility, where a flexible re-allocation of resources is crucial. We also consider the
role of capital intensity in the alleviation of demand-related risk, and find that de-
mand fluctuations are more effectively offset in more capital intensive industries.
Results are reported in Annex A.2.3.
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cess capacity as the result of strategic interaction: incumbents install
more physical capacity and commit more to gain higher market shares
and deter entry. A similar interpretation for excess capacity has been
provided by models including stochastic demands and mixed duopolies.
Within the theoretical literature, Chapter 3 provides a new explana-
tion for excess capacity. Firms in two different countries install capac-
ity under demand uncertainty, and adjust their production levels using
labour once final demand has realized.14 In this context, labour reg-
ulation affects firms’ cost structures, and more or less flexible labour
markets lead to lower or higher adjustment costs. These country-level
asymmetries ultimately affect firms’ capacity decisions by making firms
substitute differently between capacity and labour. More specifically,
there is overcapacity in the country where labour is more rigid and
labour adjustments more costly. Also Dewit et al. (2013) investigate
the link between labour institutions and excessive commitment, with
respect to a given employment level. Firms’ choice is affected by the
country level of employment protection, and the authors show that, un-
der quantity competition, the rigid location is preferred.
On the empirical side, the approach has generally focused on the
assessment and measurement of capacity and CU,15 or on its role in
business cycles,16 as reported in Chapter 2.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no applied works that look
at the impact of employment protection on the rise of over capacity.
The existing literature has in fact analyzed the impact of EPL on other
relevant elements of firm dimension, such as factor productivity, capi-
tal investment decisions and the capital-labour ratio. Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993) consider the impact of firing restrictions on the re-
allocation of resources and conclude that more stringent restrictions
impede firms to freely move workers, and resources, towards their most
efficient use and eventually have a negative effect on labour produc-
tivity. Also Saint-Paul (2002) confirms the existence of a negative link
between EPL and firm’s productivity: by investigating the effect of fir-
ing restrictions on innovation, the author explains that this source of
rigidity makes firms prefer secondary, and safer, innovation on existing
products over primary, and riskier, innovation on new products. More-
over, Bassanini et al. (2009) study the relation between EPL and TFP,
identifying a lower growth rate in countries with a more binding labour
legislation.
Still, Belot et al. (2007), and Lagos (2006) show that, under some
circumstances, EPL can ultimately have a positive impact on labour
productivity. More precisely, according to Belot et al. (2007), firms fac-
ing workers’ dismissal protection might have more incentives to invest
in firm specific human capital, but this result holds as long as EPL is suf-
14 Ex-post adjustments can be either positive or negative, depending on final demand.
15 See, for instance, Nelson (1989) and Berndt and Hesse (1986).
16 See, for instance, Hansen and Prescott (2005).
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ficiently low. Under Lagos (2006), an increase in the reservation wage,
under stringent EPL, can induce a more selective employee-employer
matching process, with positive spillovers on overall productivity.
The EPL literature has devoted consistent attention also to labour
market dynamics, linking the effects of labour legislation to a lower job
turnover rate. These results are confirmed by Autor et al. (2007) and
Kugler and Pica (2008), who respectively look at job turnover rates
of American and Italian firms. Also, Micco and Pages (2006) show
that a more stringent regulation implies a significant drop in turnover,
with even stronger consequences in sectors with high demand volatility.
Haltiwanger et al. (2006) predict instead a more severe impact of EPL
in industries with high job reallocation needs.
Last but not least, Bertola (2004) and Koeniger and Leonardi (2007)
analyze the effect of labour market regulation of firms’ investment de-
cisions. Whereas the former work traces the reduction in the optimal
investment level back to the hold-up problem, the latter explains that
EPL, by increasing labour costs, encourages the adoption of more cap-
ital intensive technology. On the other hand, Cingano et al. (2010)
identify a negative link between EPL and the capital-labour ratio, con-
cluding that dismissal restrictions negatively affect investment, capital
and value-added per-workers, with a more dramatic impact in sectors
with high job reallocation needs.
4.3 research method and data
4.3.1 Empirical strategy
In this paper, we measure excess capacity with the share of physical
capacity that is not used by a given sector, in a given country, at a given
year. Then, to evaluate the effect of EPL we consider independently its
sub-specifications:17
1. Total EPL;
2. Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts;
3. Regulation of temporary contracts.
These three different measures are defined only at the country level and
do not capture essential sector characteristics, such as the irreversibility
of investments. This is why we match the level of EPL with the sector
specific level of capital intensity and estimate the joint impact of these
two constraints on the rise of excess capacity. To overcome potential
endogeneity issues, we follow the seminal approach of Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998) and use the time invariant level of capital intensity of the
17 See Venn (2009). We exclude from the analysis of collective dismissal regulations:
first of all, because of its limited data availability. Then, this index reports the addi-
tional restrictions to be respected in case of massive lay-offs, and the interpretation
of the results may be misleading.
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corresponding US manufacturing industry.
To predict this relation, we estimate the following equation:
ECjct = β1 + β2EPLict + β3K/LUSAj + β4EPL
i
ct ∗K/LUSA+
+β4(Xjct) + µj + µc + µjt + µct + µcj + εjct
(34)
where ECjct is the excess capacity in sector j, country c, year t, EPLict
is the country-year level of Employment Protection,18 K/LUSA is the
time invariant level of capital intensity in the United States, for sector j,
Xjct is a matrix of other country sector information, µj ,µc,µjt,µct,µcj
are respectively sector, country, sector/year, country/year and coun-
try/sector fixed effects and εjct is the residual.
4.3.2 Data
To investigate the effects of labour market rigidity on the rise of excess
capacity, we exploit the following data sources:
1. The Business and Consumer Survey (BCS), that gathers CU rates
for European industries;19
2. The OECD Employment Protection Labour index;
3. The INDSTAT2 2013 Unido database, providing industry specific
information.
The BCS20 provides quarterly and monthly time series information,
collecting harmonized answers to questions21 concerning the plant op-
erating status, mainly regarding the CU rate.22 This information is
available for 27 European countries and 21 sectors23 from 1990 to 2010.
18 Where i denotes the different EPL classifications: total EPL, EPL on regular workers,
and EPL on temporary workers.
19 To the best of our knowledge, this CU rate has only been introduced by Planas et al.
(2010) to assess the link between output gap fluctuations and TFP.
20 Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/time_series/
index_en.htm
21 Quarterly questions are: factors limiting production, assessment of current produc-
tion capacity, the duration of production assured by current order-book levels, new
orders in recent months, export expectations for the months ahead, current level of
CU, competitive position in the domestic market, competitive position inside and
outside the EU. Monthly questions are instead: business confidence indicator, the
production trend observed in recent month, assessment of order-book levels, assess-
ment of export order-book levels, assessment of stocks of finished products, produc-
tion expectations for the months ahead, selling price expectations for the months
ahead and employment expectations for the months ahead.
22 Data are collected and gathered by the country Statics Offices. Annex A.2.2 sum-
marizes the collection and harmonization methodology for the countries included in
the sample.
23 Nace 1.1 classification, 4−digit level.
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From the assessment of the current CU rate, we retrieve our proxy for
excess capacity:
Excess of capacityjct = 100− capacity utilization ratejct.
The OECD EPL database24 contains information for 40 different
countries, covering the period 1985-2008. This data source provides
measures for total labour market rigidity according to three different
classifications: rigidity of regular employment, rigidity of temporary em-
ployment and rigidity of collective employment. The measurement for
protection on temporary and regular workers is available throughout
the whole period considered. All these three indicators can vary from
0− 6, where 0 represents the least restricted legislation and 6 the most
restricted one.25
The measure of US capital intensity is retrieved from the Unido Ind-
stat2 2013 revision and is defined as the ratio between gross fixed cap-
ital formations, in $, and the number of workers. We also gather a
measure of value added, at the country-sector level, to control for po-
tential changes in our dependent variable that can be traced back to
changes in final demand.26 From the Unido database we retrieve other
industry information, such as the wage compensation and the number
of plants, used as additional controls.27
The final panel consists of 21 European countries and 21 manufac-
turing industries, classified at the Nace 1.1 Revision at the 2-digit level,
from 1990 to 2008. In total we have approximately 5500 observations28
and 441 country-sector observations.29
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 4 reports the summary statics for the main variables of interest.
The average share of under-exploited capacity is approximately one
fifth of overall physical capacity, or the 20% of existing capacity. On
average, the normalized sector US capital intensity is relatively low: in
1990, at the beginning of our sample, the average capital intensity was
0.17, whereas the sample-average is 0.1 and the average annual value
is 0.044. As far as labour indicators are concerned, all the reported
24 Available at
www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm#
data
25 For more information on the methodology: www.oecd.org/els/emp/
EPL-Methodology.pdf
26 We also controlled for a standardized measure of GDP, only available at the country
level, but opted for a more specific level of analysis as changes in demand might not
be symmetric within countries.
27 For instance, the number of plants allows us to control for changes in the excess of
capacity due to plant turnover, whereas the ratio between the number of plants and
the number of employees gives us an approximate estimate of the plant size.
28 The panel is unbalanced.
29 For a detailed list of countries and sectors included in the analysis see Annex A.2.1.
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averages, with the exception of collective lay-off restrictions, are slightly
above 2. Figure 14 plots the countries included in the sample according
to their average level of EPL over the period considered.30
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max.
Excess capacity 19.044 7.292 0.075 90.925
EPL_Total 2.237 0.863 0.6 4.1
EPL_Temporary 2.132 1.39 0.25 5.38
EPL_Regular 2.347 0.777 0.950 4.83
EPL_Collective 3.243 0.729 1.88 4.88
1990 US capital intensity 0.172 0.196 0 1
average capital intensity 0.101 0.16 0 1
annual capital intensity 0.044 0.077 0 1
Table 4: Summary statistics
1st quartile
2nd quartile
3rd quartile
4th quartile
Out of sample
Figure 14: Average EPL, 1990-2008
Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients, at the 1% statistical sig-
nificance, for the main variables used in the estimation process. Clearly,
all the four measures of employment protection are significantly corre-
lated. Interestingly, the measure for collective dismissal is negatively
correlated with the two other classifications of EPL. Excess capacity is
negatively correlated with total EPL31 and EPL on regular workers, but
the coefficient is positive with respect to collective dismissals and the
protection of temporary workers.
4.4 results
As a preliminary analysis, we estimate the impact of the different clas-
sifications of EPL on the rise of excess capacity, without taking into
30 Country averages are classified in quartiles: the first quartile is from 0.66 to 1.73,
the second quartile ranges from 1.73 to 2.23, the third quartile from 2.23 to 2.69
and the fourth quartile from 2.69 up to 3.63
31 Although the correlation magnitude is negligible.
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Exc_cap Total Regular Collective Temporary
Exc_cap 1
EPL Total −0.05∗ 1
EPL Regular −0.15∗ 0.62∗ 1
EPL Collective 0.16∗ −0.07∗ −0.26∗ 1
EPL Temporary 0.02 0.90∗ 0.20∗ 0.07∗ 1
∗ significant at 1%.
Table 5: Correlations
account the sectoral degree of investment irreversibility. To this pur-
pose, we look at the effect of the EPL classifications alone and together.
Results are reported in Table 6. Specification (1) reports the joint effect
of all the EPL measures,32 whereas specifications (2)-(4) look at their
individual effects.33 When jointly considered, all the measures, expect
for total EPL, have a positive and significant impact on the accumu-
lation of excess capacity.34 Still, results change when considering the
effects separately, and the only significant effect stems from collective
measures.
To further disentangle the effect of these measures, we concentrate
on one classification of EPL at a time and look at its impact on excess
capacity.
4.4.1 Total EPL
Table 7 reports the effect of total EPL, without distinguishing between
its sub-classifications. Specifications (1) and (2) interact it with the US
capital intensity in 1990, specifications (3) and (4) with the US average
capital intensity. In each specification, we control for final demand, as
measured by the sector-country value added, and for changes in the
underlying market structure, reflected by the change in the number of
plants. The effect of EPL alone is negative, and this direction is mainly
driven by the effect of the protection of temporary workers.35 Still, we
observe that the sign of the interaction term is positive: as EPL increases,
more capital intensive industries will tend to experience a higher level
of excess capacity,36 as displayed in Figure 15.
To have a closer look at the joint effect of the two considered con-
straints, we evaluate the marginal effect of total EPL along the whole
32 Also including the effect of the additional restrictions for massive lay-offs.
33 The change in the number of observations is due to the limited availability of infor-
mation on additional collective dismissal procedures.
34 The effect of EPL on regular and temporary workers is significant at 10.1%.
35 See Table 9.
36 The regressors for capital intensity have been omitted as time invariant.
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Excess capacity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EP_overall -10.794* -0.561
(6.441) (0.454)
EP_collective 0.424*** 4.338***
(0.112) (1.090)
EP_temporary 5.244 -0.326
(3.232) (0.237)
EP_regular 5.279 0.680
(3.258) (0.739)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.087 0.077 0.072 0.077 0.076
N 3836 5560 3836 5560 5560
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level in parentheses.
In Specification (1) we performed the regression on the square root of excess capacity.
Table 6: Effect of EPL
distribution of capital intensity.37 More precisely, from equation (34),
we estimate the following linear marginal effect for each dimension of
EPL:
marginal effect of EPL = β2 + β4K/Lpj , (35)
where K/Lpj denotes the value of the capital intensity variable at per-
centile p. Figure 15 represents the marginal effect for total EPL, which is
is increasing in the level of capital intensity and becomes positive after
a certain threshold. This trend is confirmed by the separate estima-
tions that include EPL on regular and temporary workers, respectively
in Tables 8 and 9.38
37 Since the variable refers to one country only and it is time invariant, it has a dis-
crete distribution over the normalized interval (0, 1). Given the limited number of
observations available, when computing the marginal effect we generate a fictitious
distribution for the reclassified capital intensity: starting from its minimum real-
ization, we increase it by an additional 0.01 at each iteration, up to the original
maximum realization.
38 In a separate analysis, we look at the impact of EPL on capital intensity, which, in
our framework, is defined as the capital-labour ratio. Our results are in line with the
predictions of Cingano et al. (2010) of a negative link between these two variables.
Still, this evidence is not against the predictions of Chapter 3, where we were rather
looking at the impact of EPL on the accumulation of potential output.
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Excess capacity (1) (2) (3) (4)
EP_overall -4.195** -0.996 -4.935** -3.923**
(1.842) (1.763) (2.104) (1.975)
1990 K/L 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
Interaction 1 4.564** 4.848**
(1.964) (2.358)
Average K/L 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
Interaction 2 3.514 4.956
(2.758) (3.091)
Value added 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Change # plants -0.003 -0.007
(0.004) (0.006)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.342 0.368 0.297 0.325
N 4622 3686 5560 4352
1990 and average capital intensities are constant over time and have been omitted
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level.
Table 7: Total EPL
4.4.2 Protection of regular workers
Table 8 reports the effect of the protection on regular workers, and fol-
lows the same construction of Table 7. This type of protection has a
positive, though not always significant, impact on excess capacity. More-
over, the interaction term is positive,39 confirming the pattern observed
above: more capital intensive industries, with a more severe investment
irreversibility, suffer more from an increase in regular worker protection.
The marginal effect of EPL on regular workers is displayed in Figure 16:
it positive, and increasing, for any level of capital intensity.
Labour intensive industries are affected only by the exogenous con-
39 Although it is significant only when it involves the average capital intensity in spec-
ification (3).
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Figure 15: Marginal effect of Total EPL
on 1990 US Capital Intensity
straint on labour protection, and will reduce their labour force follow-
ing an increase in EPL, and the absence of sunk costs prevents them
from accumulating excess capacity. Capital intensive industries face in-
stead an additional constraint, that stems from the irreversibility of for-
mer investment decisions: as EPL increases, they not only reduce their
labour force, but they may also sub-optimally exploit their installed
capacity and experience overcapacity during economic downturns. The
complementarity between capital and skilled labour, or senior workers,
observed by Janiak and Wasmer (2012) may then explain this trend.
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Figure 16: Marginal effect of EPL Regular
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Excess of capacity (1) (2) (3) (4)
EP_regular 4.357*** 4.023* 3.660 -1.441
(1.572) (2.284) (3.519) (2.081)
1990 K/L 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
Interaction 1 5.331 1.438
(6.927) (6.273)
Average K/L 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
Interaction 2 16.889* 13.528
(8.999) (8.370)
Value added 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Change # plants -0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.006)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.340 0.366 0.298 0.325
N 4622 3686 5560 4352
1990 and average capital intensities are constant over time and have been omitted
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level.
Table 8: Protection of regular workers
4.4.3 Protection of temporary workers
As a last step, we perform the analogous analysis for the protection of
temporary workers. Results are reported in Table 9. Contrary to what
observed so far, an increase in the protection of atypical workers re-
duces excess capacity. As temporary workers become more and more
protected, firms tend to replace them with regular labour. In fact, the
correlation between this type of protection and employment is posi-
tive and significant, as reported in Table 5.40 As previously discussed,
the complementarity between regular workers and capital explains why
more regular workers contribute to a better CU rate and reduce excess
40 The 0.08 correlation coefficient is significant a 1%. Also, employment is negatively
correlated with excess capacity: −0.0264 at the 10% significance.
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capacity. Still, Table 5 shows an additional effect: an increase in the
protection of temporary labour is significantly correlated with a 0.2
increase in the protection of regular workers. This effect explains the
positive sign of the interaction term in the regression output. The in-
crease in EPL for regular workers partially offsets the better exploitation
of physical capacity and makes firms reduce their employment levels, as
described before. The overall effect is stronger in capital intensive indus-
tries, whose investments are more irreversible, as displayed in Figure
17.
Excess of capacity (1) (2) (3) (4)
EP_temporary -3.520*** -1.947** -2.249** -1.785*
(1.156) (0.954) (0.896) (0.966)
1990 K/L 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
Interaction 1 2.153** 2.435*
(1.042) (1.248)
Average K/L 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
Interaction 2 1.458 2.223
(1.486) (1.665)
Value added 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Change # plants -0.003 -0.007
(0.004) (0.006)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.342 0.368 0.297 0.325
N 4622 3686 5560 4352
1990 and average capital intensities are constant over time and have been omitted
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level.
Table 9: Protection of temporary workers
The interaction term, and thus the marginal effect of EPL Temporary,
is displayed in Figure 17, and it is clear, once again, that the effect is
stronger as investments become more irreversible.
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4.5 robustness analysis
In this section, we carefully look at the consequences of increasing EPL.
In Section 4.5.1 we preserve the fixed-effect dimension and look at what
happens, in the short-run, when EPL increases. In Section 4.5.2, we
perform a diff-in-diff analysis to assess the long-run consequences, in
terms of excess capacity, of an increase in EPL.41
4.5.1 Increases in EPL
The measure of EPL used in the main analysis is available at the country
level and is relatively stable over time. Hence, to capture its effect on
the accumulation of excess capacity, we construct a new variable that
proxies labour policy changes. We thus create a dummy variable that
is equal to 1 whenever there is an increase in labour protection,42 and
interact it with the US and EU capital intensity. Results are reported in
Tables 10 and 11 respectively. We observe an increase in excess capacity
following an increase in the protection of workers, as firms perceive this
increased protection as an additional cost. Interaction terms, although
not significant, are positive, in line with the main analysis: the effect of
an increase in EPL is stronger, in terms of accumulating excess capacity,
in more capital intensive industries.
41 To keep this robustness analysis as general as possible, we only consider the effect
of total EPL.
42 20% of the sample experiences an increase in total protection.
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Excess
capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shock
EPLT
6.748** 5.621*
(3.374) (3.136)
Shock
EPLR
7.018** 5.303*
(3.440) (3.119)
Shock
EPLTP
6.743** 5.695*
(3.413) (3.157)
Interaction
1
1.459 0.422 1.493
(2.635) (3.320) (3.115)
Interaction
2
3.416 3.035 2.976
(3.456) (4.400) (4.149)
Value
added
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change
# plants
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Country
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-
Sector
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-
Country
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.328 0.327 0.327
N 4094 4094 4094 4795 4795 4795
1990 and average capital intensities are constant over time and have been omitted
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Table 10: Increases in EPL and Capital intensity (US)
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Excess
ca-
pac-
ity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shock
EPLT
17.827*** 6.031*
(1.553) (3.153)
Shock
EPLR
18.002*** 4.967
(1.500) (3.194)
Shock
EPLTP
17.464*** 6.134*
(1.722) (3.191)
Int.
1
3.357 -0.341 11.035
(5.910) (5.545) (10.741)
Int.
2
0.992 5.247 0.352
(5.837) (7.535) (6.531)
Value
added
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change
#
plants
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Country
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-
Sector
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-
Country
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.494 0.494 0.494 0.327 0.327 0.327
N 1868 1868 1868 4793 4793 4793
1990 and average capital intensities are constant over time and have been omitted
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Table 11: Increases in EPL and Capital intensity (EU)
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4.5.2 Diff-in-diff
In this section, we apply the diff-in-diff analysis to evaluate the long-run
effect of increases in labour protection legislation.43 We perform two
different types of analysis, to evaluate respectively a 2-year and multi-
year effect. In the 2-year effect, we simply compare the treated and
control group at the end and beginning of our sample. Still, countries
can change labour policy at different years, so we also perform a multi-
year effect to take this into account. To this purpose, we estimate the
following equations:
Excess_capacity =β0 + β1t+ β2treated+ β3(t ∗ treated)+
(36)
β4K/L+ β5V alue_added+ u
Excess_capacity =β0 + β1dummy_year+ β2treated2+
β3(t ∗ treated2) + β4K/L+
β5V alue_added+ u
where t = 1 in 2008 and t = 0 in 1990; treated = 1 if EPL2008 >
EPL1990, and 0 otherwise, dummy_year is the multi-year dummy, and
treated2 = 1 if the annual growth rate of EPL is positive. Results are
reported in Table 12.
The coefficients of the two interaction terms confirm, and to some ex-
tent, extend our predictions to the long-run, the results of the main
empirical analysis: overtime, increases in labour market rigidity are
detrimental to excess capacity, and countries providing more labour
protection tend to experience higher excess capacity.
4.6 conclusions and discussion
This paper is the first effort to investigate the empirical consequences
of labour rigidity on excess capacity. Labour protection impedes in
fact the efficient allocation of resources towards their most efficient use,
and firms, that perceive EPL also as an additional cost, reduce their
labour force and sub-optimally exploit their existing capacity. Whereas
in Chapter 3 we look at the ex-ante consequences of EPL on the in-
vestment decision, in this Chapter we look at the ex-post consequences.
In other words, we look at the short run output adjustments and at
CU rates as a function of EPL and capital intensity. Our results show
43 We also performed an aggregate data analysis on the observations experiencing
negative output gaps, but the effect were not particularly significant.
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(1) (2)
t 1.620
(1.405)
treated 0.000
(.)
t*treated 3.278
(2.984)
K/L -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Value Added 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Dummy_treatment_multi 0.000
(.)
t*Dummy_treatment_multi 4.077**
(1.848)
Year FE No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes
R2 0.077 0.121
N 399 372
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 12: Diff-in-diff on micro excess of capacity
that a tightening in dismissal restrictions may have ambiguous effect
on excess capacity, depending on the type of protection considered and
on the underlying complementarity between the factors of production:
skilled and capacity vs. and unskilled and capacity. Still, we confirm
the predictions of Chapter 3 and observe that an increase in dismissal
restrictions for regular workers generates excess capacity.
Furthermore, we also look at the role of investment irreversibility in
the generation of excess capacity, and find a very robust evidence: an
increase in labour protection is more detrimental, in terms of excess
capacity, in capital intensive industries.
To assess the robustness of these results, we implement two different
analysis: first of all, we preserve the fixed-effect dimension and evaluate
the impact of increases in EPL on the short-run excess of capacity. We
also perform a diff-in-diff analysis to measure the difference in excess ca-
pacity of those observations experiencing an increase in EPL, relatively
to those that did not. Both these alternative specifications predict a
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positive effect of EPL on the accumulation of excess capacity.
This paper contributes to the animated debate regarding the impor-
tance of reducing labour market rigidity. Former analysis have stressed
the impact of EPL on a variety of parameters, ranging from labour pro-
ductivity to job turnovers. This work sheds some light on the short-run
consequences of myopic labour regulations, and it proves, jointly with
the underlying theoretical analysis, how excessive labour protection
may alter firms’ rational investment decisions by making them choose
unsustainable commitment levels. The findings of this work may also
be important as they succeed in taking account certain sector character-
istics, such as capital intensity. Hence, policy makers may benefit from
these evidences by implementing sector-specific labour regulation.
A
APPENDIX
a.1 the theoretical paper
a.1.1 Stylized facts: probit analysis
To investigate the effect of labour costs on the rise of excess capacity,
we also estimate the impact of labour costs on the probability of incur-
ring negative output gaps, that is, the probability of generating excess
capacity. Table 13 reports the estimation result for this probit analysis,
column (1), and the marginal effect, column (2). The marginal effect of
unit labour costs is positive and significant, suggesting that an increase
in labour costs increases the probability of incurring a negative output
gap by 0.55. The effect of an increase in GDP per capita is instead
negative, although not significant.
Probability of having a negative output gap Estimation Mfx
Unit labour cost 1.409*** 0.550***
(3.91) (4.06)
Log GDP per capita -0.283 -0.111
(-1.91) (-1.93)
Cons 1.575
(1.21)
N 638 638
t statistics in parentheses
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level.
Table 13: Probability of having a negative output gap
a.2 the empirical paper
a.2.1 Countries and sector
Our sample includes the following European countries: Austria, Bel-
gium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We
include the following Naics 1.1 industries:
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• 15: Food products and beverages;
• 17: Textiles;
• 18: Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
• 19: Tanning and dressing of leather; luggage, handbags, saddlery,
harness and footwear
• 20: Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;
articles of straw and plaiting materials
• 21: Pulp, paper and paper products
• 22: Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
• 23: Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
• 24: Chemicals and chemical products
• 25: Rubber and plastic products
• 26: Other non-metallic mineral products
• 27: Basic metals
• 28: Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
• 29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c.
• 30: Office machinery and computers
• 31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
• 32: Radio, television and communication equipment and appara-
tus
• 33: Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
• 34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
• 35: Other transport equipment
• 36: Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
a.2.2 Capacity utilization methodology
This section quickly reports the collection and aggregation methodology
for gathering the CU rate f the Business and Consumer Survey.1 For
each country included in the sample, Table 14 reports the sampling
method, the sample size coverage, the response rate, and the weighting
scheme.
1 More detailed information can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/db_indicators/surveys/documents/bcs_user_guide_en.pdf and at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/documents/
metadata2/metadata_all_indu_en.pdf.
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a.2.3 Demand uncertainty
As an extension to the main analysis, we evaluate the joint impact of
EPL and demand volatility to assess which industries suffer more from
an increase in labour protection. In this way, we extend the predic-
tions of Cunat and Melitz (2012) to our setting. In their framework,
labour flexibility may act as a comparative advantage since firms can
move resources, and workers, to their most efficient use when it is more
relevant to do so. In other words, countries with a relatively flexible
market have a comparative advantage in exporting in relatively more
volatile industries. In our setting, we expect to observe excess capacity
in sectors more subjected to demand variations, and we also expect
that an increase in labour protection is more detrimental to firms op-
erating in more volatile industries. To measure demand volatility, we
calculate the Standard Deviation of the annual-country-sector output
growth. Table 15 reports the results for the different classifications of
labour protection. Of all the classifications considered, only the pro-
tection of temporary workers in Specification (3) significantly interacts
with demand volatility. The effect of EPL alone is positive, and, more in-
terestingly, an increase in the protection of temporary workers is more
binding in industries with a high demand volatility. These industries
need flexible labour to react to demand changes, as stressed by Cunat
and Melitz (2012). Thus, an increase in firing restrictions is inevitably
more binding in those industries that need flexible labour to accommo-
date demand fluctuations. In equation (37) and Table 15 we look at
the joint impact of EPL and demand volatility:
ECjct = β1 + β2EPLict + β3V olatilityjct + β4EPL
i
ct ∗ V olatilityjct+
+β4(Xjct) + µj + µc + µjt + µct + εjct
(37)
As a last step, we look at the relation between capital intensity and
demand volatility and wonder if capital intensity may somehow soften
the impact of demand shocks. Results are reported in Table 16 and
suggest in fact that an increase in the level of capital intensity may
reduce the impact of demand volatility on the accumulation of excess
capacity.
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Excess capacity (1) (2) (3)
EP_collective 7.118**
(3.351)
Demand volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
Interaction term 0.076
(0.259)
EP_regular 3.250
(2.251)
Interaction term -0.050
(0.475)
EP_temporary 1.223*
(0.681)
Interaction term 0.547*
(0.291)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Year and country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year and sector FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.267 0.297 0.298
N 3812 5523 5523
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level.
Table 15: Demand uncertainty
Excess capacity (1) (2)
K/L -11.313* -6.907
(5.891) (4.314)
Demand volatility 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
Interaction term -0.658 -3.069**
(1.350) (1.375)
Country FE Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes
Year and country FE No Yes
Year and sector FE No Yes
R2 0.003 0.310
N 4947 4947
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level.
Table 16: Capital intensity and demand uncertainty
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